Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry. (English) Zbl 1188.90135
Summary: We investigate a contract setting problem faced by a manufacturer who can procure major modules from an overseas supplier, as well as a local supplier. The overseas supplier is prime and offers quality products, whereas the local supplier is viewed only as a backup, and its products are inferior in quality. As the local supplier needs to put in additional effort to fulfill the urgent orders, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate this urgent supplier’s production cost. This asymmetric cost information becomes an obstacle for the manufacturer in managing the urgent supplier. In this paper, we study two types of contingent contracts. One is the common price-only contract, and the other is a contract menu consisting of a transfer payment and a lead time quotation. We construct a Stackelberg game model and evaluate how the involvement of an urgent supplier with private cost information affects performances of the prime supplier and the manufacturer in different scenarios (with or without the urgent supplier, under different contingent contracts). We also conduct numerical experiments to show how the parameters of the contracts affect profits of the manufacturer.
MSC:
| 90B50 | Management decision making, including multiple objectives |
| 91B42 | Consumer behavior, demand theory |
| 91B44 | Economics of information |
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
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