The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games. (English) Zbl 1184.91094
Summary: In this study, we provide the conditions for efficient provision of a public good in a participation game in which a non-negative integer number of units of the public good can be provided. In the case in which at most one unit of the public good can be provided, we provide refinements of Nash equilibria at which agents choose only a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and provide sufficient conditions for cost-sharing rules that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation. In the case of a multi-unit public good, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and prove that Nash equilibria are less likely to support efficient allocations if the participation of many agents is needed for efficient provision of the public good in the case of identical agents.
References:
| [1] | Aumann R (1959) Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In: Tucker AW, Luce DR (eds) Contributions to the theory of games IV. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 287–324 · Zbl 0085.13005 |
| [2] | Bag PK (1997) Public goods provision: applying Jackson–Moulin mechanisms for restricted agent characteristics. J Econ Theory 73: 460–472 · Zbl 0879.90059 · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.2232 |
| [3] | Bagnoli M, Lipman B (1989) Provision of public goods: fully implementing the core through private contributions. Rev Econ Stud 56: 583–602 · Zbl 0686.90012 · doi:10.2307/2297502 |
| [4] | Dixit A, Olson M (2000) Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem. J Public Econ 76: 309–335 · doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00089-4 |
| [5] | Jackson M, Moulin H (1992) Implementing a public project and distributing its cost. J Econ Theory 57: 125–140 · Zbl 0763.90031 · doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4 |
| [6] | Palfrey T, Rosenthal H (1984) Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis. J Public Econ 24: 171–193 · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9 |
| [7] | Saijo T, Yamato T (1999) A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good. J Econ Theory 84: 227–242 · Zbl 0919.90037 · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2476 |
| [8] | Shinohara R (2007) Voluntary participation in a mechanism implementing a public project. Staff Paper Series #2007-02, Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University. http://members.at.infoseek.co.jp/ryukai_sh/wp/project.pdf |
| [9] | Yu Y (2005) Public goods provision: Unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core. Rev Econ Des 9: 363–376 · Zbl 1124.91326 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
