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Persuasive advertising under Bertrand competition: A differential game. (English) Zbl 1142.91346

Summary: We investigate a linear state differential game of advertising, under Cournot and Bertrand competition. A unique saddlepoint equilibrium exists if the marginal cost of advertising is sufficiently low. Bertrand competition entails more intense advertising than Cournot competition, since increasing market size is more important to firms when competition is tough.

MSC:

91A23 Differential games (aspects of game theory)
Full Text: DOI

References:

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