Notes on risk-sensitive Nash equilibria. (English) Zbl 1123.91001
Nowak, Andrzej S. (ed.) et al., Advances in dynamic games. Applications to economics, finance, optimization and stochastic control. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser (ISBN 0-8176-4362-1/hbk). Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games 7, 95-109 (2005).
Summary: We discuss the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium concept in static non-cooperative games and two-stage stochastic games of resource extraction. Two equilibrium theorems are established for the latter class of games. Provided examples explain the meaning of risk-sensitive equilibria in games with random moves.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1060.91001].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1060.91001].
MSC:
| 91A10 | Noncooperative games |
| 91A15 | Stochastic games, stochastic differential games |
| 91A20 | Multistage and repeated games |
