One game-theoretic model of entry deterrence using joint venture. (English) Zbl 1053.91054
Petrosjan, L. A. (ed.) et al., 10th international symposium on dynamic games and applications. St. Petersburg, Russia. In 2 vol. St. Petersburg: International Society of Dynamic Games, St. Petersburg State Univ. (ISBN 5-7997-0412-6). 910-913 (2002).
Summary: This paper is devoted to the actual problem of entry deterrence. The considered model is a generalization of S. Zhao [“Joint Ventures for Entry Deterrence”, in: Handbook of Game Theory, Vol 1, 1999, 305–329)] on the case of any given cost functions of the incumbents and entrants. All four possible cases of market structure is explicitly studied. Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the equilibrium in the discussed game and the sufficient condition for entry deterrence are found. There is also a numerical example.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 0990.00073].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 0990.00073].
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
| 91A10 | Noncooperative games |
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
