Dynamic common agency. (English) Zbl 1052.91028
Summary: A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting.
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