The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization. (English) Zbl 1038.91006
The authors develop a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. A number of theorems and lemmas are established for validation of the model but no experimentation has been made.
Reviewer: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti (Saint John)
References:
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