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Toward a theory of reinsurance and retrocession. (English) Zbl 1001.91054

This paper develops a formal game-theoretic model to examine the potential value of adding a reinsurance structure to the insurance industry and considers the possibility of an optimal number of reinsurance/retrocession levels in its design.

MSC:

91B30 Risk theory, insurance (MSC2010)
91A80 Applications of game theory
Full Text: DOI

References:

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[12] Powers, M.R., Shubik, M., Yao, S.T., 1994. Insurance market games: scale effects and public policy. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1076. Yale University, New Haven, CT.; Powers, M.R., Shubik, M., Yao, S.T., 1994. Insurance market games: scale effects and public policy. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1076. Yale University, New Haven, CT.
[13] Powers, M. R.; Shubik, M.; Yao, S. T., Insurance market games: scale effects and public policy, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 67, 2, 109-134 (1998) · Zbl 1035.91038
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