The articles of this volume will not be indexed individually.
Vol. 1. Contents: Thomas S. Kuhn, What are scientific revolutions? (7–22); I. Bernard Cohen, Scientific revolutions, revolutions in science, and a probabilistic revolution 1800–1930 (23–44); Ian Hacking, Was there a probabilistic revolution 1800–1930? (45–55); Lorenz Krüger, The slow rise of probabilism: philosophical arguments in the nineteenth century (59–89); Andreas Kamlah, The decline of the Laplacian theory of probability: a study of Stumpf, von Kries, and Meinong (91–116); Michael Heidelberger, Fechner’s indeterminism: from freedom to laws of chance (117–156); Gérard Jorland, The Saint Petersburg paradox 1713–1937 (157–190); Ivo Schneider, Laplace and thereafter: the status of probability calculus in the nineteenth century (191–214); Eberhard Knobloch, Emile Borel as a probabilist (215–233); Lorraine J. Daston, The domestication of risk: mathematical probability and insurance 1650–1830 (237–260); Zeno G. Swijtink, The objectification of observation: measurement and statistical methods in the nineteenth century (261–285); Stephen M. Stigler, The measurement of uncertainty in nineteenth-century social science (287–292); Lorraine J. Daston, Rational individuals versus laws of society: from probability to statistics (295–304); Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, Décrire, compter, calculer: the debate over statistics during the Napoleonic period (305–316); Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer, Probability in vital and social statistics: Quetelet, Farr, and the Bertillons (317–335); Karl H. Metz, Paupers and numbers: the statistical argument for social reform in Britain during the period of industrialization (337–350); Theodore M. Porter, Lawless society: social science and the reinterpretation of statistics in Germany, 1850–1880 (351–375); Ian Hacking, Prussian numbers 1860–1882 (377–394); M. Norton Wise, How do sums count? On the cultural origins of statistical causality (395–425).
Vol. 2. Contents: Gerd Gigerenzer, The probabilistic revolution in psychology – an overview (7–9); Gerd Gigerenzer, Probabilistic thinking and the fight against subjectivity (11–33); Kurt Danziger, Statistical method and the historical development of research practice in American psychology (35–47); Gerd Gigerenzer, Survival of the fittest probabilist: Brunswik, Thurstone, and the two disciplines of psychology (49–72); David J. Murray, A perspective for viewing the integration of probability theory into psychology (73–100); Anthony Oberschall, The two empirical roots of social theory and the probability revolution (103–131); Mary S. Morgan, The probabilistic revolution in economics - an overview (135–137); Claude Ménard, Why was there no probabilistic revolution in economic thought? (139–146); Robert A. Horváth, The rise of macroeconomic calculations in economic statistics (147–169); Mary S. Morgan, Statistics without probability and Haavelmo’s revolution in econometrics (171–197); William Coleman, Experimental physiology and statistical inference: the therapeutic trial in nineteenth-century Germany (201–226); John Beatty, The probabilistic revolution in evolutionary biology – an overview (229–232); M. J. S. Hodge, Natural selection as a causal, empirical, and probabilistic theory (233–270); John Beatty, Dobzhansky and drift: facts, values, and chance in evolutionary biology (271–311); John R. G. Turner, Random genetic drift, R. A. Fisher, and the Oxford school of ecological genetics (313–354); Bernd-Olaf Küppers, On the prior probability of the existence of life (355–369); Lorenz Krüger, The probabilistic revolution in physics – an overview (373–378); Jan von Plato, Probabilistic physics the classical way (379–407); Nancy Cartwright, Max Born and the reality of quantum probabilities (409–416); Nancy Cartwright, Philosophical problems of quantum theory: the response of American physicists (417–435).