Mikey B.'s Reviews > Paris, 1919: Six Months that Changed the World

This book examines the peace negotiations that took place from January to July in 1919 – plus many issues and events beyond those dates. The Paris negotiations and decisions were an attempt to remake the world after the devastation wrought by “The Great War” – to avoid any further confrontations.

The four main protagonists were Georges Clemenceau (France), Lloyd George (U.K.), Woodrow Wilson (U.S.) and Vittorio Orlando (Italy). In many ways they all did their best – and their worst. We still live with their decisions today – particularly their cartographic ones. One example is what would the world be like today if the Kurds had been given their own homeland. This was considered by our protagonists and their many aids, but nothing came of it.

Woodrow Wilson comes off as the most obstinate and most holy of the lot. He was unable to compromise on many issues. He was literally beaten down by the end of the conference. The idealism of his Fourteen Points came up against the realities of the European quagmire.

Page 285 (my book) Sidney Sonnino aid to Orlando

“Is it possible to change the world from a room, through the actions of some diplomats? Go to the Balkans and try an experiment with the Fourteen Points.”

Wilson’s concept of self-determination enunciated in his Fourteen Points added flame to a growing nationalism across the globe. It became, in a very real sense “Self-determination for my people, but certainly not yours”. Central Europe was a hodgepodge of many nationalities in small areas, often thrown together harmoniously, but often times not.

One questions the intellectual capacity (or maybe the hubris) of Woodrow Wilson of his knowledge of the world beyond his country. Lloyd George often acknowledged his limited geographic knowledge. The greater the distance from the British Isles the foggier his familiarity became of the people and places.

Page 486

The demand for nation-states based on single nationalities was not itself rational in the world of 1919. It was not possible, then, to put all Poles in Europe into Poland and all Germans into Germany. In Europe alone, 30 million people were left in states where they were an ethnic minority, an object of suspicion at home and of desire from their co-nationals abroad.

The European powers and people expected too much from the United States and Woodrow Wilson. These anticipations were so high that disappointment was inevitable. They did not realize that the U.S. military was not going to stay and protect them. Clemenceau knew this – and his fears of the eternal German foe were correct.

The book is detailed as we move from country to country – and the range is vast - encompassing Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The author is excellent with the many colourful personalities involved (but why did she have to refer to some as “ugly” or “stupid”?).

There was a tendency, at least on my part, to get lost in the trees. There was such a wide swirl of events and decisions that one tends to lose the overall picture. Sometimes the author repeated herself – for example that the United States was not going to be involved in a protective mandate for Armenia – which ended up being absorbed by the Soviet Union (their other choice was Turkey – so not much of a choice).

Sometimes the author can be vague. On page 446 she states “By the summer of 1919, British forces in the Ottoman Empire were down to only 320,000 men.” This is still a lot of troops. What were they doing? She does not explain this.

She does, I feel, correctly point out that the Treaty of Versailles did not precipitate World War II.

Page 482

The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame [for World War II]. It was never consistently enforced, or only enough to irritate German nationalism without limiting German power to disrupt the peace of Europe. With the triumph of Hitler and the Nazis in 1933, Germany had a government that was bent on destroying the Treaty of Versailles.

To blame Versailles is to fall under the spell of Hitler who was a master at using scapegoats and hate for Germany’s problems – and promoting ultra-nationalism (self-determination) – to blame the Jews, Versailles, the French, the democracies…

It is commendable that Franklin Roosevelt learnt from the grievous mistakes of Woodrow Wilson – he started the process for the U.N. well before the end of World War II and brought both parties onboard for the U.N. He did not isolate and belittle Republicans like Woodrow Wilson did.

One of the saddest chapters was on Japan’s request for racial equality. It was turned down by Clemenceau, Wilson, and Lloyd George. Here is something that cost nothing – no territorial demands or sacrifices required, and nothing monetary. But these white imperialist leaders could not bring themselves to acknowledge equality. The British Empire would have none of that. So much for “All men are created equal” and “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”.