Talk:Hirohito/Archive 7

Can see all Japaner deniers are out in force. Hirohito was a vile war criminal responsible for the deaths of millions of Chinese citizens. Anyone who denies it basically is denying holocaust against China done on Hirohito's orders. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.248.70.40 (talk) 19:26, 4 August 2020 (UTC)

No one denies that these things were done. What is denied is that Hirohito had any true power beyond nominal. This is the position America took on the matter, and decided to so strongly that when, after the war, Hirohito sought to express his formal apology for his country's actions to Marshall (for in Japanese culture, this would be the proper thing for the emperor to do in such a situation), Marshall would not allow any audience to be given for such purpose: because, he said, the emperor is not at fault in any wise, therefore we can't receive an apology from one who has not done anything retiring one. Firejuggler86 (talk) 18:33, 20 November 2020 (UTC)

The article doesn't deny the Japanese war crimes, but neither does it deny that Hirohito had true power: the war crimes are an undeniable reality, and the extent of Hirohito's power is a controversial matter not yet settled by historians. The closest thing to a consensus among historians that exists today is that Hirohito was neither a powerless figurehead nor a western-style dictator, but something between those two extremes. In the recent book Emperor Hirohito: The Life and Legacy of Japan's Ruler during World War II, by Charles River Editors (December, 2019), we can read that "to imagine Hirohito as a helpless puppet, a purely constitutional monarch manipulated by ruthless politicians and generals, is an error. Indeed, he was always an active participant in the most important events before and during Japan’s war against the Allies. In hindsight, it’s clear that the image of Hirohito as a powerless figurehead emerged as part of a legend deliberately created by America and its allies following the war to help maintain a peaceful occupation of Japan. With the dawn of the Cold War, Japan was needed as an ally, allowing it to serve as a potential bulwark against Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. Rebuilding Japan into a strong and stable power became a priority, and for this, Hirohito was needed to provide continuity and a form of rule to which the Japanese people were accustomed." My personal opinion largely agrees with the analysis seen in this paragraph. Not only Hirohito, but other figures such as Prince Asaka or Shiro Ishii benefited from American geopolitics. That's my opinion. Obviously, Wikipedia can not take sides on any side in a matter under debate: the article exposes the controversial nature of the matter, as well as the different points of view existing among historians, without going to give the final reason to one or the other. But it does not deny war crimes or one or another extent of Hirohito's power during the war. It neither does nor could in any case, with the evidence available to date.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 05:00, 22 November 2020 (UTC)

Personal opinions by wiki editors don't count. The article lacks evidence that most or many historians call him a "war criminal." There is a good review of the historiography by NORIKO KAWAMURA: "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States" Diplomatic History January 2007, Vol. 31, No. 1 pp. 51-79 online at JSTOR. I can send a copy --write me at rjensen@uic.edu He states p 52: " Most of the works published in English by Western scholars who carefully studied Japanese primary sources tend to confirm the Tokyo Trial view of Emperor Hirohito's role in the war decision...." ie Hirohito was NOT a war criminal because he did not make the decisions. Robert Butow for example argues that Hirohito: " was personally against going to war with the United States but that his influence was limited and could not reverse the war decision unanimously reached by the military and the Tojo cabinet." However there was a minority view: [p 53] " Both David Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy published in 1971 and Herbert Bix's Pulitzer Prize winning book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan in 2000 suggest that the emperor as a real war leader was actively involved in the decision-making process. Bix strives to demonstrate that from late 1940, the emperor 'made important contributions during each stage of policy review, culminating in the opening of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain in December 1941.' " Rjensen (talk) 06:58, 22 November 2020 (UTC)

Precisely, what I have said in my message is that Wikipedia's position cannot be my personal opinion or that of any individual on a matter that, like this one, is under debate. But, precisely for this reason, it should not take sides in an unresolved debate, exposing only the different theses and which authors defend them. This issue is known for its controversial nature and current lack of true consensus. Noriko Kawamura's opinion (like that of any other historian) is not per se the last word nor does it settle this discussion. She cites a book from Robert Butow (Japan's Decision to Surrender) that was published in 1954, when the figurehead thesis was almost unanimous. It was after Hirohito's death that the vast majority of works that follow the critical thesis emerged. Even Butow himself wrote in 1990: "The recent illness and death of the 124th Emperor of Japan have briefly focused attention once again to questions, first reased nearly half a century ago, concerning the nature and extent of Hirohito's participation in the decision-making process prior to 1945. The role he played in the coming of the war in the Pacific has been central to the discussion but has produced little unanimity of opinion" (bolds are mine) [1]. Not only Bergamini and Bix are critical historians about Hirohito's role in the war. It is evident that the article cites many more authors and works in that thesis. In the web of Atomic Heritage Foundation it is stated that "a growing number of scholars, including Herbert P. Bix in his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, have said that Hirohito wielded more power than he is given credit for. They attribute public perception of his powerlessness to a concerted effort in Japan at the end of the war to exonerate the emperor by portraying him as not responsible for the state’s actions. There are clear historical examples, however, where Hirohito decisively exercised his power."

Historian Sir Max Hastings writes "American cynicism about war crimes was not confined to Hirohito. Those responsible for the appalling deeds of the biological warfare Unit 731 in China were spared because the United States wanted their expertise, just as it exploited Nazi intelligence chiefs and rocket scientists. Hirohito’s guilt is hard to dispute. But politically, the Truman administration and MacArthur probably made the right call."

In 2014, The Guardian wrotes about the official account of Hirohito's reign by the Imperial Household Agency: "The 12,000-page biography of Hirohito, posthumously known as the Showa Emperor ("enlightened peace"), took 24 years to compile at a cost of 230m yen (£1.34m). But the records, released to selected members of the Japanese media before general publication, failed to settle the longrunning debate over the extent of Hirohito's involvement in the decisions that ultimately led to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan's surrender in August 1945."

Certainly it exists an unsettled debate on this matter; we can't treat as a consensus the thesis of Francis Pike, who calls Hirohito "the war criminal who got away", but it is equally clear that this debate was not settled by Noriko Kawamura in 2007, and her thesis is not a consensus among historians (perhaps it was in 1954, but not today).

In short, I think it is quite accepted that there is no consensus on the debate on the extent of Hirohito's power and his responsibility in the war, that is the position that I observe in the article and I think it is correct.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 13:14, 22 November 2020 (UTC)

Wikipedia's job is to report that a controversy exists among experts, AND report Noriko Kawamura's analysis of all the studies that the majority agree that he was NOT a war criminal. Bix is in the minority among the experts. As I read Bix he hints at but he does not firmly state that Hirohito was a war criminal. Rjensen (talk) 22:38, 22 November 2020 (UTC)

First, you can address me without capital letters. I understand exactly the same.

Second, I don't know what the person who opened this section was talking about, but I am talking about the power Hirohito had and his degree of involvement in the war, not whether or not he falls into the category of "war criminal." If you want, I'll talk about it tomorrow, including the issue of the pilots of the Doolittle squadron.

Third, I highly doubt that neither Noriko Kawamura nor anyone else has made a complete catalog of the opinion of all historians about Hirohito. For example, what does Kawamura say about The People's Emperor by Kenneth J. Ruoff, or Ils étaient sept hommes en guerre by Marc Ferro, or Hirohito's war by Francis Pike? What is her complete selection? An incomplete selection can't stablish numbers. Is her analysis of works complete or selective? Does it represent well the last 30 years of controversy, or does it over-represent works from the Cold War years, when there was a clearly hegemonic thesis? I don't think all historians have been listed by Kawamura (herself is part in the controversy, moreover). Her analysis can be reported, of course, but it is not a complete study of all historians works (a single person is incapable of such a thing) and therefore can't be incorrectly represented as such.

Finally, it is clear that you and I are not going to agree. You are not going to resolve here a controversy that the historians have not resolved for decades. If you like, after taking my time, I'll make you a complete list of all the Hirohito-critical historians I know and his works. You will see how Kawamura did not quote even a third of them. I repeat, Kawamura's analysis can be reported, but its value is much less than what you assign to it. In any case, it is clear to me that we will never agree.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 01:23, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

The last commentator suggests that a) no one historian can read the complete literature and b) therefore no historian is totally reliable. That misunderstands how historians actually work. What they try to do is look not at the popular literature (like newspapers and TV shows and blogs) but at the scholarly literature that has passed peer review. In this case Historical abstracts" shows that worldwide it has evaluations on 72 scholarly articles and 11 scholarly books dealing with Hirohito. Then you read all those and look at the footnotes to see what you have overlooked. Add them. You also check "Google scholar" to see what books and papers get cited most often. (To see cites to Bix look at https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=2751377999446913392&as_sdt=5,27&sciodt=1,27&hl=en ) Then make the generalizations. The historian then writes a paper to read at conferences and takes critiques from all scholars on all sides. Then a revised paper is sent to a scholarly journal where editors and outside reviewers evaluate it --suggesting items that might have been overlooked or misinterpreted. The editor either rejects it or asks for a rewrite. If the paper passes the next round it gets published. This is the "peer review" process. It works well in historiography for every major country and generates the sort of reliable information that wikipedia relies upon. Rjensen (talk) 05:49, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

No, I didn't say "no one historian can read the complete literature and therefore no historian is totally reliable"; I said "an analysis on the works of other authors that doesn't include the complete literature is not an analysis of all studies, but of those selected". If I reacted in the same way, I would say "the last commentator suggest that a) every historian passes multiple filters before publishing their articles and b) therefore all historians are totally reliable and they can't disagree with each other, because all their papers are strongly filtered". Yes, this isn't what he wrote, but is what can be said if I reacted in the same way. On the other hand, it is clear that no historian is totally unquestionable, and less about controversial issues (as proven by the fact that historians themselves totally disagree among themselves). When I read the work of several historians, I am rarely convinced by each and every one of them (the normal thing is that some convince me and others do not), and not always all of them seem equally honest in their motivations.

In any case, and although we do not agree, I appreciate your education and good tone and the abandonment of capital letters. It is evident that I am speaking with a person with culture and knowledge, although we do not agree on this specific matter. Discrepancy should never lead to personal disrespect.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 08:33, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

In historiographical debates (like this one) I am arguing that the history profession has a pretty good system to tell what are the majority and minority views among scholars. In this case the majority is "not a war criminal" and the minority (led by Bix) = "probably a war criminal." Bix sees himself in the minority and says that his book opposes the established viewpoint at p. 14. That's what Wikipedia should report. I am referring now to reliable sources on Hirohito's career--not to writers who make a casual three-sentence comment. Rjensen (talk) 09:37, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

I see... I think we haven't been talking about the same thing. Only a question: What are you referring to by "writers who make a casual three-sentence comment"? In don't know what is it in all which have been commented. Quotes from historian's opinions based on their knowledge of the subject are certainly not "casual three-sentence comments".--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 09:50, 23 November 2020 (UTC)

I had writers like Max Hastings in mind. Rjensen (talk) 07:31, 27 November 2020 (UTC)

Really? Max Hastings is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and I consider him an author as respectable as any other. But I don't mean to start a discussion about Max Hastings now. Instead, I will use this message to clarify (I hope definitively and without the need to elaborate further) the reason for my intervention in this discussion and my position on the matter.

First of all, I have intervened to respond to the messages of the first two commenters (77.248.70.40 and Firejuggler86). 77.248.70.40 talked about deniers of Japanese war crimes: It is true that there are deniers, but on this question there is an undeniable consensus among historians, and the article doesn't adopt denialist positions on this matter in any of its contents. It's the first thing I wanted to say. Firejuggler86 replied to 77.248.70.40 that "what is denied is that Hirohito had any true power beyond nominal": the article doesn't deny that Hirohito had true power (although it does not affirm it either, since on this issue there is no consensus, but a controversy not yet settled, so it is not possible for the article to take sides on a particular side of the discussion, which it would do if will adopt the negation that Firejuggler86 defends).

Then, I cited a paragraph from one of the more recently published books on Hirohito (Emperor Hirohito: The Life and Legacy of Japan's Ruler during World War II, by Charles River Editors) to illustrate the existence of a relevant opinion among historians that disagrees with that expressed by Firejuggler86. To elaborate more on this concept, I mentioned the fact that I largely share the position expressed in that paragraph (I think I have the right to say what opinion I have on the matter without this being understood as a claim to adhere to it).

That's all I said. I was talking about the extent of Hirohito's power, and not about if his actions can or not be considered as war crimes, although there is no consensus on both issues to date. Now, I'll cite some paragraphs more on the matter:

Kenneth J. Ruoff, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Portland State University, writes in his book The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (p.127) that "If 'war responsibility' means participating in the policymaking process that led to the commencement and prosecution of an aggressive war (for many Japanese, the key issue was the responsibility for defeat, not complicity in an aggressive war), then there is growing evidence that Emperor Hirohito played a considerable role in this area", and later (p.132) writes that "It is neither fair nor historically correct to make Hirohito a scapegoat for the war, for the emperor was far from being a powerful leader along the lines of Hitler. Nonetheless, Hirohito's responsibility for the war was immense in comparison to that of the average Japanese. Togashi's portrayal of a resolutely pacifist emperor appears laughable when read in tandem with accounts of Hirohito's deep interest in matters of war. On those occasions when emperor Hirohito expressed reservation about Japan's entering into a conflict with other nations, his foremost concern was weather Japan could win. Furthermore, Hirohito's primary concern in the process leading to Japan's surrender was the preservation of the kokutai, or unbroken imperial line, not concluding the war as quickly as possible in order to prevent further suffering".

In Emperor Hirohito: The Life and Legacy of Japan's Ruler during World War II we can read that "The attempt after the war to portray Hirohito as a pacifist who was against the war with America does not tally with the known facts. Hirohito did not directly bring about the war, but the few records which survived appear to show that he enthusiastically supported it, al least in its early and successful stages".

These paragraphs represent my own opinion quite well (which is not to say that I intend to impose it on those who may disagree with me; I know very well that this is a controversial matter). But I may even be close, at some specific point, to the opinion of an author with whom I generally disagree. That's the case of Stephen S. Large, when he writes that "the fact he formally sanctioned nearly every decision for war, notwithstanding his personal preferences for peace, means that he should have been held accountable for his share of war-responsibility". This does not agree 100 percent with my point of view, but it is quite close.

Certainly, when the Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Portland State University says that portraying Hirohito as a resolutely pacifist emperor appears "laughable" it is evident that such a portrayal is at least questionable and that we do not have to necessarily share that portrait.

Finally, I would like to mention that since English is not my mother tongue, I somewhat overlooked the title of this section. With regard to including the article "Hirohito" in the category of "war criminals", I think it is inappropriate for two reasons:

First, because there is no consensus on this matter (although I believe that Hirohito was a war criminal, and I do, there is no consensus on such a position). I was told at one point that the article lacks evidence to undoubtedly classify Hirohito as a war criminal. That's obvious: if there were conclusive evidence in this regard, there would be no controversy and there would be an overwhelming consensus, which, as we know, is not the case in this matter.

Second, because I think the category of "war criminals" in Wikipedia should be applied only to convicted war criminals. Why? Because "war criminal" is a legal concept and should be applied from a legal point of view. Regardless of what we think about Hirohito's actions he was never tried nor convicted as a war criminal and therefore the article on him cannot be categorized in there. The articles on Hitler and Mussolini are not specifically categorized as "war criminals" either, although there is historical consensus on this in their case. But they were not convicted as war criminals and that is a legal concept. All the more reason then for not including in a case open to debate such as Hirohito's.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 14:25, 27 November 2020 (UTC)

After considering it for some time, I think that, apart from explaining what I wanted to talk about by taking part in this discussion (as I did in November), it would be good to also detail my point of view on the other question that arose in it, that is, the current state of the debate among historians, beyond the obvious fact that it is not yet settled. To do this, I will quote what was written about it by two historians: Kenneth J. Ruoff, in his book The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2001) and Peter Wetzler, in his recent book Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire (2020).

Ruoff writes: "The view that the emperor, before and during the war, was little more than a figurehead who simply ratified his ministers' decisions was the orthodox interpretation, at least until recently". Later, Ruoff adds that "Many documents pertaining to Hirohito have become available in recent years. The debate over his pre-surrender role nonetheless remains polemical. In the English-language literature, there are no recent wholehearted champions of the orthodox interpretation." (p.89) In the following paragraphs and pages, Ruoff analyzes the contrast between the more benevolent interpretations of Stephen S. Large and the more critical ones of Daikichi Irokawa, Kentaro Awaya, and Herbert Bix. (pages 89-91). Ruoff reiterates these claims, word for word, in his recent book Japan's Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (2020, pages 95-98).

Peter Wetzler asserts that "During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the testimony offered by Tôjô Hideki, and gladly accepted by US officials, succeeded in exonerating the Shôwa Emperor of war guilt. The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time." Regarding Hirohito's possible war criminality, Wetzler writes that "Based on the information known to me I would not presume to condemn or exonerate the Shôwa Emperor. Instead a differentiated answer vis-à-vis the Emperor's 'war crimes' from a historical point of view: according to the definitions then, with the information we have now, yes he was guilty as some would charge. But much of this information was not available immediately after the war and the charges were based on 'international laws' applied inconsistently ex post facto." Both of Wetzler's paragraphs are at page 175 of his book.

I have highlighted in bold the most significant phrases in relation to how I see this matter. Certainly, the state of this debate was not the same before Hirohito's death (when the apologist thesis was the official "orthodoxy" and represented an almost absolute consensus) than in the years after the Emperor's decease, when new documents became available, and now most historians, as Wetzler says, acknowledge the Emperor's deep involvement in wartime politics, although the debate regarding the exact scope of that involvement and its possible incurrence under the category of "war crimes" is not yet settled and it is still open.

This is all I wanted to add now. For the rest, I refer to what I wrote in my previous messages.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 13:44, 1 March 2021 (UTC)

It seems that at some point, the portrait was replaced with some sort of AI-colorized version. I would replace it with the unaltered black-and-white version, but the article is semi-proteced. I would appreciate it if someone could fix it.--100.34.159.56 (talk) 01:10, 2 March 2021 (UTC)

  Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. There are other b&w versions on Commons, such as File:Hirohito in dress uniform (cropped).jpg and File:Hirohito wartime(cropped).jpg​ that are used in other enwiki articles and several different other-language articles; however, thus far the consensus appears to be to use the colorized version in this article. Feel free to attempt to garner consensus for a different image, and then that different image may be used. Thank you very much for your input! P.I. Ellsworth  ed. ^put'r there 01:35, 2 March 2021 (UTC)

Shall we move this to his posthumous name? Another Wiki User the 2nd (talk) 23:49, 27 March 2021 (UTC)

No, per WP:COMMONNAME. Mgasparin (talk) 18:37, 26 October 2021 (UTC)

I agree, the article name should be changed. Not only is Emperor Shōwa far more commonly referred to just as "The Emperor" or "Emperor of Japan", within the context World War II, but "Shōwa" is his proper posthumous name, and is the format used for every other Japanese emperor's Wikipedia article title. No one, including Wikipedia, refers to Emperor Meiji as "Mutsuhito", or Emperor Taishō as "Yoshihito". BUZZLIGHTYEAR99 (talk) 08:10, 24 December 2021 (UTC)

I find the bibliography lacking. David Bergamini's book, "Japan's Imperial Conspiracy", published in 1972, I consider an important contribution to the discussion. Bergamini's thesis is that Hirohito enforced the Meiji Constitution's dictate that The Emperor be all powerful. Should The Emperor commit errors the blame for those errors fell on his advisors. Bergamini asserts that since Japan would have been ungovernable if Hirohito were hung, McArthur assigned the blame to his subordinates. On reviewing the suggested edits, I note that I am not the only holder of this opinion. Harold Blytt — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hblytt (talk • contribs) 15:43, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

Bergamini sounds like he is asserting a wildly erroneous thesis. It is fairly elementary knowledge that much of the Emperor Shōwa's power was nominal, and that in reality his powers were far more limited. Even beyond the purview of what his specific legal powers were, he had been raised in such a manner as to seldom, if ever directly interfere in national politics, having been brought up under the motto of "reign, not rule". Furthermore, I fail to see how the Emperor could "commit errors" while it is not even within the scope of his power to do such basic things such as introducing policy. If Shōwa were the sort of autocratic absolute monarch some people give the impression he was, you'd think he'd at least have the legal power to some as simple as that. In truth his role was far more of an advisory one if anything, giving feedback on and rubber-stamping decisions reached by the national cabinet. These views are supported by John Toland's The Rising Sun. BUZZLIGHTYEAR99 (talk) 20:45, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

Regardless of the specific author (Bergamini), whom I will refer to later, I totally disagree with BUZZLIGHTYEAR99. Since the days of John Toland's book (1970), many years have passed and much documentation has come to light that was still unpublished at the time. If BUZZLIGHTYEAR99's claims were truly "fairly elementary knowledge", then there would be no controversy among historians about Emperor Hirohito's role in the war and the extent of his involvement. But the truth is that there is. At 'Atomic Heritage Foundation' website we can read "But a growing number of scholars, including Herbert P. Bix in his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, have said that Hirohito wielded more power than he is given credit for."

But this is not limited to Herbert P. Bix. Many other historians have similar thoughts on this matter. For example, Kentaro Awaya states that Hirohito not only gave advice in all important decisions of the government and the army, but he closely supervised his orders to be sure they have been respected. Sir Max Hastings claims: "For several decades after World War II, a legend was sedulously promoted, chiefly by the Japanese, of Hirohito's long-standing pacifism. This view is now discredited. The emperor shared many of the army's ambitions for his country (...)" Kenneth J. Ruoff, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Portland State University, says in his book The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 that "If 'war responsibility' means participating in the policymaking process that led to the commencement and prosecution of an aggressive war (for many Japanese, the key issue was the responsibility for defeat, not complicity in an aggressive war), then there is growing evidence that Emperor Hirohito played a considerable role in this area". Peter Wetzler, in his book Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire writes that "During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the testimony offered by Tôjô Hideki, and gladly accepted by US officials, succeeded in exonerating the Shôwa Emperor of war guilt. The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time." Daikichi Irokawa, in his book The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan shows that Hirohito had strong opinions in such areas as diplomacy, war strategy, and personnel and on several occasions exerted influence. In August 1939, the emperor expressly designated two candidates, Umezu Yoshijiro (1882-1949) and Hata Shunroku (1879-1962), for the office of war minister in the Cabinet of Abe Nobuyuki (1875-1953), and Hata was selected. Irokawa wrote: “The emperor… was actively involved in the crucial affairs of state; he certainly was not the passive constitutional monarch that the official scholars (and Hirohito himself, in postwar years) have so convincingly portrayed.” In relation to the Pulitzer-winning biography of Hirohito written by Herbert P. Bix (Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan), Professor Forrest E. Morgan argues that "Bix rightly dispels the emperor’s popular image as a helpless, symbolic leader, who was a virtual puppet of Imperial Japan’s military oligarchs and unaware of how his government was prosecuting the war. Drawing from previously unexamined documents, he ably demonstrates that the emperor was fully aware of Japan’s political behavior and intimately involved in military planning even at the operational level. Based on Bix’s evidence, it is clear that the emperor was an active participant in Japan’s decision making process."

And so I could go on to infinity. What I want to emphasize is that, since Hirohito's death, a lot of documentation has appeared that seriously questions the old thesis of the "powerless figurehead" and there is a huge and still unsettled controversy among historians about the extent of his power and responsibility for the war. Certainly, the apologist version of Toland's book is far from being "fairly elementary knowledge". Quite the contrary, it is seriously questioned today.

As for David Bergamini, I adhere to the words of Professor Herbert P. Bix: "Bergamini tried to make sense of the Japanese monarchy and Emperor Hirohito, but he embedded his whole analysis in a vast conspiratorial theory. (...) But Bergamini got the main point right: Hirohito was no passive onlooker at the events unfolding around him. Unfortunately, Bergamini set back scholarship on the emperor, and after him graduate students were reluctant to tackle the subject."

Bix's words are part of an interview by Education About Asia - Association for Asian Studies. It can be read here. I think it is very informative and interesting.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 14:07, 31 December 2021 (UTC)

David Bergamini and Japan's Imperial Conspiracy both have Wikipedia articles. Bergamini, as it turns, isn't a historian, and is best known for writing some Time-Life volumes. And for his book, some choice sections of critiques:

• "[Japan's Imperial Conspiracy] is a polemic which, to our knowledge, contradicts all previous scholarly work.... Specialists on Japan have unanimously demolished Bergamini's thesis and his pretensions to careful scholarship. - Professor Charles Sheldon of Cambridge University in "Japanese Aggression and the Emperor, 1931-1941, from Contemporary Diaries," Modern Asian Studies 10#1 (1976) pp 1-40; quote on p. 1; online

• "A check of Mr. Bergamini's references reveals the flimsy, gossamer-thin basis of his argument...The material that is presented does not supply a foundation on which to build a theory of imperial conspiracy." - Richard Storry, Professor of Japanese Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford, in "Imperial Conspiracy in Japan?" Pacific Affairs 45#2 (1972), pp. 272-276, quotes on pp 272, 276. online

• "Most upsetting is the selective, misleading use of sources to buttress a tortured thesis wherein accidents are inconceivable, honest mistakes improbable. The object is to incriminate the emperor personally in every crime and aggression. - Professor Alvin Coox of San Diego State University in the American Historical Review 77#4 (1972) p. 1169-1170 online

You're going to have to do a LOT better to convince me that Bergamini is worth any attention. --Calton | Talk 05:14, 1 January 2022 (UTC)

I apologize if I am answering what is not directed to me, but it is not entirely clear to me if Calton's comment is directed to Hblytt, to me or to both, so I answer as far as it may concern me.

As I said at the beginning of my previous comment, I speak independently of the matter specifically referred to Bergamini, which I address only at the end of it. My comment is a reply to BUZZLIGHTYEAR99's, in which none of the arguments I use is based on Bergamini's book.

Without repeating again everything I stated in my previous comment, I do reiterate that I reaffirm everything I have said, based on the following authors:

• Kentaro Awaya.
• Sir Max Hastings.
• Kenneth J. Ruoff.
• Peter Wetzler.
• Daikichi Irokawa.
• Forrest E. Morgan (on Herbert P. Bix's book).
• Herbert P. Bix.

There are many more authors that I can cite following the same thesis, but I limit myself to those that I cited in my previous comment to clarify my position, if necessary. None of the criticisms referred to Bergamini and his book can be extended to any of these authors.

As for Bergamini, I reiterate my opinion. I adhere to what was said by Professor Bix. In essence: although Bergamini got the main point right (Hirohito was no passive onlooker at the events unfolding around him), he embedded his whole analysis in a vast conspiratorial theory. This point is the one that discredits him and what justifies all the criticisms cited.

Bix said on Bergamini: "Remember, Bergamini's book was published in 1971," he replied. "At the time very little had been written that contravened the MacArthur myth. His book took some courage, but embedded in it was a full-blown conspiracy theory that no sane person could accept. It had a strong moralistic tone, equating, say, Nanking with Hiroshima, and it made Hirohito out to be a dictator. Relying to a large extent on anecdotal evidence, it was easy to attack and put a lot of people off the idea of Hirohito's culpability in the war."

Bix's words can be read here.

In short, I do not argue that Bergamini's book deserves attention as a source, unlike the authors on whose works I have based my position, but I do maintain that the allegation of the apologist thesis about Hirohito as if it were an incontrovertible truth is not a valid argument for it.

I have already explained what I think are the failures of Bergamini for which his book is not the adequate source for the support of the critical theses about Hirohito and his role in the Second World War, but as I say this, I must also say that, according to the sources I have cited and many others, the responsibility of the emperor in the war is a highly controversial matter, the old apologist position is today seriously questioned and cannot constitute, per se, the basis of the argument to rule out Bergamini as source. The valid reasons are other, as I have just explained, and as I think I did also in my previous comment.

I apologize again if Calton's comment was not addressed to me, but I thought it necessary to clarify my position about Bergamini in particular, since I was not sure if I had made it clear enough and, therefore, if the aforementioned comment was also directed to me.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 10:32, 1 January 2022 (UTC)

Per Wikipedia:Short description, arrange to "124th emperor of Japan from 1926 to 1989". 2001:4452:490:6900:E1BA:1BC2:CDA0:41D0 (talk) 04:37, 17 February 2022 (UTC)

  Not done ~ short description is already there with that information. Happy days ~ Lindsay^Hello 09:08, 17 February 2022 (UTC)

Japan waged the wars across Asia in the 1930s and 40s in the name of Hirohito,[3] whom they revered as a god.

"They" doesn't match "Japan". Please change "they" to "it", or please change the last clause to "who was revered as a god": your choice. Also, "the wars" sounds weird; please change it to "war". 49.198.51.54 (talk) 05:35, 24 June 2022 (UTC)

  Done 💜  melecie  talk - 10:18, 24 June 2022 (UTC)

In this sentence

He and his family maintained a strong public presence, often holding public walkabouts and making public appearances on special events and ceremonies.

Please change "on" to "at". People appear "at" events, not "on" them. 49.198.51.54 (talk) 22:57, 24 June 2022 (UTC)

  Done. Aidan9382 _(talk) 06:43, 25 June 2022 (UTC)

Unless I am mistaken, Showa became the only reigning emperor in the world as early as 1975 with the death of Haile Selassie. Shouldn't that be the date in the lead, with at most a footnote about the later upstart reign of Bokassa? 67.180.143.89 (talk) 01:14, 23 February 2023 (UTC)