Article Contents

2023, Volume 13, Issue 2: 299-313. Doi: 10.3934/naco.2022013

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Optimization method in counter terrorism: min-max zero-sum differential game approach

1.
Basic Science Department, Faculty of Computers and informatics, Suez Canal university, Ismailia, Egypt
2.
Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Tanta University, Tanta, Egypt

^*Corresponding author: heba.tallah@ci.suez.edu.eg
^*Corresponding author: heba.tallah@ci.suez.edu.eg

Received: May 2021

Revised: April 2022

Early access: June 2022

Published: January 2023

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Abstract

One of the most critical problems facing governments at present is terrorism. Most recent studies are striving to find an optimal solution to this problem that threatens the security and stability of people. To combat terrorism, government uses various means, such as improving education quality, providing labor opportunities, seeking social justice, creating religious awareness, and building security arrangements. This study aims to evaluate the optimum strategy for both government and terrorist organization using a min-max zero-sum differential game approach. In addition, it analyses the dynamics of the government's activities separately and explain the impact of the government's counter-terror measures on the activity and strength of international terror organization.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A23; Secondary: 49N70, 49N90.

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