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The context of the game

Published: 06 July 2009 Publication History

Abstract

In games of incomplete information, the analyst must specify the players' choices, payoff functions, and hierarchies of beliefs (about the payoffs of the game). The importance of correctly specifying players' choices or actual payoff functions is well understood. (See, Kreps-Wilson [8, 1982] and Milgrom-Roberts [10, 1982], amongst many others.)

References

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Liu, Q., "Representation of Belief Hierarchies in Games with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 2009.
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Cited By

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  • (2014)Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rulesTheoretical Economics10.3982/TE11119:2(339-360)Online publication date: 2-Jun-2014
  • (2013)Finite-order type spaces and applicationsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.007148:2(689-719)Online publication date: Mar-2013
  • (2011)Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice gamesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.00372:1(288-300)Online publication date: May-2011

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences
TARK '09: Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
July 2009
272 pages
ISBN:9781605585604
DOI:10.1145/1562814

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 06 July 2009

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TARK '09 Paper Acceptance Rate 29 of 77 submissions, 38%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2014)Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rulesTheoretical Economics10.3982/TE11119:2(339-360)Online publication date: 2-Jun-2014
  • (2013)Finite-order type spaces and applicationsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.007148:2(689-719)Online publication date: Mar-2013
  • (2011)Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice gamesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.00372:1(288-300)Online publication date: May-2011

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