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RFC, 5 January 2023

We currently have the following two sentences for MEK's ideology in the lede:

  • Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s.[needs update][1]
  • critics have described the group as "resembling a cult",[2][3][4] while its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[5]

Should we replace them with the following:

In its violent revolutionary struggle which is reflected in its name, Mojahedin-e Khalq (the People's Holy Warriors),[6][7][8][9] Mojahedin embraced a combination of Marxism and Islamism as the base of their belief.[10][11][6] Later on, in 1985, Rajavi's "ideological revolution" imbued the MEK with many typical characteristics of a cult.[12][13]

Yes or NO? Ghazaalch (talk) 05:50, 5 January 2023 (UTC)

Survey, 5 January 2023

  • Yes: We have lots of materials (such as Ideology and Cult of personality) concerning MeK's ideology in this article but there is not a comprehensive mention of them in the lede, while we have materials such as the following that are repeated in the lede:
  • It advocates overthrowing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and installing its own government.[30][31][32]
  • its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[77]
Ghazaalch (talk) 06:41, 5 January 2023 (UTC)
  • Yes: The replacement text better defines what the group's ideology actually is, as opposed to simply contrasting it with something else, which is an incredibly unhelpful form of description/summary. It's actually quite remarkable that the word 'Marxist' currently never appears anywhere in the lead. The group's subsequent 'ideological revolution' and morphing into something quite different from its origins is also a matter of public record. The previous statement about it being "the next government of Iran" is just meaningless, fringe WP:CRYSTALBALL crap. Every political group wants to be the next government; that's kind of the point of politics/revolution, but imagine the endless redundancy if "could be the next government" was noted at the foot of every opposition party/dissident group lead. Iskandar323 (talk) 07:54, 5 January 2023 (UTC)
  • Obvious No: per WP:SYNTH, WP:CHERRYPICKING, and WP:NPOV (the [needs update] tag also is not in the lead!). The MEK and the IRP were in armed conflict in the 1980s, but that's no longer the case. The 'schism' before that (where some members left the MEK in favour of Marxism) never changed the MEK's "revolutionary interpretation of Islam [which] contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s" (this quote is by an expert on the MEK, and the academic literature is also clear and consistent about that). Cherrypicking few sources about the 70s and 80s and then WP:SYNTH them together in the lead (with complete disregard of the context or the academic literature) would be a violation of several policies. A middle ground solution may be to just move "critics have described the group as "resembling a cult",[4][5][6] while its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[7]" to the body, (which would help shorten the lead). Fad Ariff (talk) 13:14, 5 January 2023 (UTC)
    The update tag is not in the lead because you have repeatedly removed it [1], as well you know, so why not just be clear, note that you removed it and explain that you disagree with the need for an update. Intentionally omitting any mention of your own role in removing those tags and then remarking on it as if you do not know exactly why those tags are not there is a behaviour that is very hard to interpret as being in good faith. On the point of updating, you disagree with material that you think dates to the 80s, yet you also want to keep stuff dating to the 70s? Iskandar323 (talk) 13:26, 5 January 2023 (UTC)
I reverted the tag that the OP (repeatedly) tried to add because there were no grounds for adding those tags (something that was explained [2] to the OP before he initiated this RFC). Fad Ariff (talk) 13:18, 6 January 2023 (UTC)
  • It's occurred to me that this claim that the MEK might set up "a free and democratic Iran" and likewise its criticisms of the regime as "monopolizing power", "trampling over democratic rights" and being a "one-party dictatorship" are quite ironic in the context of there being no information on the MEK itself ever holding any kind of leadership election. Iskandar323 (talk) 04:23, 6 January 2023 (UTC)
WP:FORUM comments, like this one, should be kept away from the survey section. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:18, 6 January 2023 (UTC)
  • No cherry picking of sources to imply biased conclusions (that don't provide any context on their own). It's evident that this would be POV pushing in the lead. NMasiha (talk) 20:31, 5 January 2023 (UTC)This user has been globally banned from editing Wikimedia sites.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:55, 21 January 2023 (UTC)
  • Yes. Let's consider academic sources; Abrahamian states that the ideology of MEK "can be described best as a combination of Islam and Marxism"[14] Cohen, another expert, writes that "In his book Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, Abrahamian describes the organization’s ideology as a combination of Islam and Marxism"[15] Katzman, another expert in this field, states: "Scholars generally describe the PMOI ideology as an attempt to combine Islam with revolutionary Marxism"[16]. So there's no cherrypicking when sources explicitly support the proposal. Also, there is no POV pushing since no major counter POV such as 'MEK ideology is NOT a mixture of Islam and marxism' is not found in the independent reliable sources. Also, no WP:SYNTH - the conclusion is straightforward and nothing beyond the sources is concluded by the proposal. In addition, the above proposal does not say that Mojahedin-e Khalq has always been engaged in armed struggle. The text just talks over their ideology. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 05:51, 9 January 2023 (UTC)
  • No. Let's consider what all the academic sources in the article say with regard to the fussy sentences in Ghazaalch's proposal:
  • In its violent revolutionary struggle
The sources in the article say that the MEK together with thousands of other Iranians protested against the regime takeover, with the regime then killing many protesters. This is indeed alike what’s happening in Iran today where Iranians are being assassinated by the regime for protesting. When you have a government killing its own people this way, the situation becomes intricate. The same thing calling the MEK’s struggle against a murderous regime "violent revolutionary", which dismisses all the peaceful, political, arbitrary struggles that went on aside from the fighting.
  • reflected in its name, Mojahedin-e Khalq (the People's Holy Warriors)
There already has been an in-depth discussion about the MEK’s common names, concluding that "People’s Holy Warriors" is definitely not one of them.
  • Mojahedin embraced a combination of Marxism and Islamism as the base of their belief
This sentence fails at WP:CHERRYPICK. For example see the content in the article: "According to Katzman, the MEK's early ideology is a matter of dispute." "Katzman writes that their ideology "espoused the creation of a classless society that would combat world imperialism, international Zionism, colonialism, exploitation, racism, and multinational corporations"." "According to its official history, the MEK first defined itself as a group that wanted to establish a nationalist, democratic, revolutionary Muslim organization in favour of change in Iran." "The Iranian regime for the same reason was "eager to pin on the Mojahedin the labels of Islamic-Marxists and Marxist-Muslims"." "The MEK's ideology of revolutionary Shiaism is based on an interpretation of Islam so similar to that of Ali Shariati that "many concluded" they were inspired by him."
  • Later on, in 1985, Rajavi's "ideological revolution" imbued the MEK with many typical characteristics of a cult
This sentence also fails at WP:CHERRYPICK and WP:NEUTRAL, disproportionately showing one point of view that exemplifies the rest of Ghazaalch's proposal. The "ideological revolution" was to make men and women be equal in all things in Iran. Ghazaalch is picking the worst of the worst and proposing to put it in the lead without any regard to what's in the article. And Ghazaalch's proposal is WP:SYNTH: MEK's struggle against the regime, its early ideology, and its ideological revolution are completely unrelated to each other. Hogo-2020 (talk) 19:40, 12 January 2023 (UTC)

Discussion, 5 January 2023

Hogo-2020, If you have a different view compared to the reliable scholarly sources, then I advise you to write a reliable book, then we could include it in this article. Otherwise you should find reliable scholarly sources that challenge scholarly sources given below. As for Katzman's view, he writes that while scholars generally describe the MEK's ideology as an attempt to combine "Islam with revolutionary Marxism", today the organization claims that... Of course the organization today claim many things and deny many other things, but as I said before, this article is about what MEK has done, not what MEK has said in denying what it has done. As for the literal meaning of the title of the group: Mojahedin-e Khalq (the People's Holy Warriors), it is quite common in the articles to include such literal meanings in the first paragraph of the lede. As for MEK's ideology in the Abrahamian's book, he writes in the page 92 that This ideology can be described best as a combination of Islam and Marxism. In the page 100, he writes: The ideology of the Mojahedin was thus a combination of Muslim themes; Shii notions of martyrdom; classical Marxist theories of class struggle and historical determinism; and neo-Marxist concepts of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary heroism., and in the page 101 he writes: For exactly the same reasons, the regime was eager to pin on the Mojahedin the labels of Islamic-Marxists and MarxistMuslims. Now you are saying that because of the sentence in the page 101 we should disclude the sentence in the page 92 where Abarahimian explicitly say MEK's ideology can be describe best as as a combination of Islam and Marxism? Ghazaalch (talk) 10:43, 13 January 2023 (UTC)

Scholarly sources that confirm that "Later on, in 1985, Rajavi's 'ideological revolution' imbued the MEK with many typical characteristics of a cult"

* "During its Iraq residency, Rajavi oversaw the transformation of the organization from a political one to a cult centered on devotion to him."[17]

  • "Gradually the organization transformed into a cult around the personality of their leader, Masoud Rajavi. The following statements by two lower rank leaders of theorganization reveal the essence of this cult of personality."[18]
  • "As an objective historian, the author does not seek to judge, but only to explain how the Mojahedin have since evolved into what is clearly more of a Messianic cult than a political party. Rajavi's unlimited power over the dwindling membership, exercised by tight organization and control and by indoctrination, means that the Mojahedin sect now resembles a totalitarian dictatorship."[19]
  • "When [MEK] lost, it became the tool of Saddam Hussein until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and is now little more than a Rajavi cult with little influence in Iran and even less popularity."[20]
  • "Some, notably the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq (Organization of the People's Crusaders) – better known simply as the Mojahedin – declared that the revolution had been betrayed, took up arms against the Islamic Republic, and, setting up bases outside the country, turned into a cult resembling medieval Shi'i sects."[21]
  • "Rajavi, born in Tabas in 1948, had joined the Mojahedin in 1966 and declared himself the leader of this cult by 1981."[22]
  • "From 1985, Rajavi transformed the PMOI from a mass movement into a cult with himself as its guru. Among the weird decrees, Rajavi has ordered many married members to stop conjugal relations, and others to get divorce."[23] "By 1985 - 86, Masoud Rajavi, the already absolute leader of the PMOI , turned the organization into a cult, where he was praised and regarded to be the equivalent of Prophets Abraham, Jesus, Mohammad, Shia Imam Ali and Shia Imam Hussein."[24]
  • "To be sure, Iran International has been discredited due to its constant coverage of a rally by the MEK, a cult-like terrorist organization that espouses regime change has links to Saudi Arabia."[25]
  • "US Conservatives support a cult. Some conservatives have thrown their support behind an even stranger ally: the People's Mujahedin of Iran. But critics question that commitment [to democracy], given the cult of personality built around MEK's leader, Maryam Rajavi."[26]
  • "For instance, in discussing the love between Massoud Rajavi and his wife Maryam, the cult of personality duo who had run the Mojahedin since the 1980s, Cohen observes that: 'Rajavi loved not only the emo-tional bond they shared, but also the fact that she obeyed him blindly and totally. Shelater proved that she was devoted to the struggle.'"[27]
  • "All operate within a cult of personality built around the Mujahedin's long-time leader, Masoud Rajavi. While the Mujahedin remains the most widely feared opposition group because of period raids across the Shatt al-Arab, it is also the most discredited among the Iranian people who have not forgotten the Mujahedin's support of Iraq in the war against Iran."[28]
  • "However, the organization encourages a cult of personality around its exiled leaders - Massoud and Maryam Rajavi - so extreme that two young girls burned themselves to death when Maryam Rajavi was briefly imprisoned in Europe in 2003."[29]
  • "It has surrounded its leader with an intense personality cult, proclaiming that “Rajavi is Iran , and Iran is Rajavi.”[30]
  • "It has since gradually evolved into a strange mix of a radical cult centered around its leaders,the Rajavis, and opposition to the Iranian regime from 1988 onwards."[31]

These 15 scholarly sources ( of course there are plenty of non-scholarly reliable sources too, but since this is a controversial issue we just provide the scholarly ones) was provided by VR who further said that if you can't find a similar number of scholarly sources that deny the cult allegation then your argument amounts to WP:FALSEBALANCE.Ghazaalch (talk) 10:43, 13 January 2023 (UTC)


Sources

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 1. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ Erlich, Reese (2018). The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story Inside Iran and What's Wrong with U.S. Policy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-429-94157-3. Retrieved 14 January 2020. But critics question that commitment given the cult of personality built around MEK's leader, Maryam Rjavi.
  3. ^ "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  4. ^ CBC
  5. ^ "Trump allies' visit throws light on secretive Iranian opposition group". The Guardian. 15 July 2019.
  6. ^ a b Goulka et al. 2009, p. 2. sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  7. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  8. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  9. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.
  10. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1982). Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University. p. 92. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1fkgcnz. This ideology can be described best as a combination of Islam and Marxism. As Ruhani and Haqshenas stated years later, 'our original aim was to synthesize the religious values of Islam with the scientific thought of Marxism
  11. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 99. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. Scholars generally describe the PMOI ideology as an attempt to combine Islam with revolutionary Marxism
  12. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 38. sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  13. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16. Rajavi launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  14. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 92. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  15. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-1845192709.
  16. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 99. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  17. ^ Oxford Handbook of Iranian history. Oxford University Press. p. 376.
  18. ^ Dorraj, M. (2006). "THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SECT AND SECTARIANISM IN IRANIAN POLITICS: 1960-1979". Journal of Third World Studies. 23 (2). doi:10.2307/45194310.
  19. ^ Anthony Hyman (April 1990). "Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin". International Affairs (journal). 66 (2). doi:10.2307/2621451.
  20. ^ Anthony Cordesman (2014). Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 145.
  21. ^ Stephanie Cronin. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left. Routledge. p. 274. {{cite book}}: External link in |author= (help)
  22. ^ Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic, Volume 1, page 68.
  23. ^ Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini. University Press of America. p. 58.
  24. ^ Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini. University Press of America. p. 63.
  25. ^ Seyed Hossein Mousavian. A New Structure for Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 53.
  26. ^ Reese Erlich. The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story Inside Iran and What's Wrong with U.S. Routledge.
  27. ^ Frantzman, S.J (2010). "The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq 1987–1997 – By Ronen A. Cohen". Digest of Middle East Studies.
  28. ^ Sandra Mackey (1998). The Iranians. p. 372.
  29. ^ Slavin, B (2008). "How Do You Solve a Problem Like Iran?". The Nonproliferation Review. 15 (1).
  30. ^ John Esposito (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Abba - Fami. Vol. 1. p. 174.
  31. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai. Iraq in Crisis. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 213.

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RFC, 20 December 2022

RETAIN SENTENCE 1 WITH ADDITIONAL CITATIONS; REMOVE SENTENCE 2; DISCUSS FURTHER EXPANSION.
The question began as a proposal to remove certain text mainly on the grounds that the provided source was inadequate. This spurred efforts to locate additional sourcing. There is consensus that MEK support for the embassy occupation is well-documented and not WP:EXCEPTIONAL, so that information should be retained in some form.

Consensus is against retaining the description as "surrender" sourced only to the Guardian Q&A. There were some definitely in favor of removing it and some expressing lukewarm feeings, with no one definitely in favor of keeping it.

Consideration of the additional sources led to discussion of MEK statements denying involvement, and the broader context in relation to Iranian power struggles. This led to production of a compromise text added to the RFC by Fad Ariff. This text notes MEK's position without casting doubt on their documented involvement in the hostage situation. Iskandar23 and Ghazaalch have expressed some concerns with the exact phrasing, particularly about the speficicity of attributions. Discussion petered out without reaching a consensus on this expanded text. The additions address some significant policy-based concerns raised in discussion, so I would encourage new discussion and revisions based on it. — Sennalen (talk) 04:49, 29 March 2023‎ (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Should these two sentences be taken out of the article? Iraniangal777 (talk) 08:14, 20 December 2022 (UTC)

The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution. MEK described the eventual release of the American hostages a "surrender". Ref: Q&A in the Guardian

Text with updated sourcing:

The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] MEK described the eventual release of the American hostages a "surrender"[8] comment by Iskandar323 on 10:16, 21 December 2022

Merging text in the article with more updated sourcing:

In 1979, the Iran hostage crisis was used to push out rival political groups,[9][10] with Khomeini closing down universities (in what he termed to be a 'cultural revolution') as means to alienate the support base for the MEK.[11][12] The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran, although according to the MEK it "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents," including the MEK.[13][14][15][16]

Since Iskandar323’s proposal above doesn't address the repeated material in the article about the American embassy hostage crisis (or the sentence cited to a Q&A), this would be my proposal for merging this material in the article. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:16, 29 December 2022 (UTC)


Merging text in the article with more updated sourcing and less POV pushing/cherrypicked sourcing

This proposal address the repeated material:

The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution,[17][18][19][20][21][5][22][23] and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages.[24][25] MEK has denied the charges.[26][27][28]

This article Is about what MEK has done, not what MEK has said in denying what it has done. MEK is even denying its own official paper Mojahed. Katzaman writes: According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages . So quoting MEK’s denial (noted by Katzman) instead of the fact given by Katzman is WP:POVPUSH and WP:CHERRYPICKING. Besides, this article is already too long and we should make it shorter.Ghazaalch (talk) 07:27, 31 December 2022 (UTC)

Survey, 20 December 2022

  • Yes, per WP:ECREE which says "Any exceptional claim requires multiple high-quality sources"; and a single Q&A does not fit the bill for this sort of claim. If the Iranian regime had called the release of American hostages "a surrender", we wouldn't be adding this to Wikipedia based on sources like a Q&A. The embassy takeover in Iran happened in 1979, so there has been enough time for a book to cover this. In fact, it is covered in books and is already mentioned in the article:
"It has also been suggested that the group supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1979.[29] According to Ervand Abrahamian and Kenneth Katzman, the MEK "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents"."[30][31]
Iraniangal777 (talk) 08:17, 20 December 2022 (UTC)
NB: As noted below, the statement immediately above fails verification, with the quote starting: "The PMOI claims..." making it an MEK claim, not a Katzman claim. The Atlantic article meanwhile states in no uncertain terms that the MEK did support and participate in the embassy takeover and hostage crisis - "It has also been suggested..." is misleading. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:23, 21 December 2022 (UTC)
  • Yes. keep the version cited to academic publishers and remove the Q&A material. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:05, 20 December 2022 (UTC)
  • Comment: The statement at the top of the survey attributed to Ervand Abrahamian and Kenneth Katzman fails verification. The quote used is from Katzman's text, which says no such thing - the quote has been selectively cut and incorrectly paraphrased. Katzman says: "The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents." - which is a completely different thing. Katzman makes no truth claim about whether this was actually the case. It is unclear what the Abrahamian text says, as there is no direct quotation from the work. By way of contrast, the PMOI's support for the hostage taking is well documented as one of the reasons for the designation of the group as a terrorist organization by the US state department, e.g.: [3] Indeed, the MEK played an instrumental role in the hostage taking. "Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.[32] - making it unclear how this can be considered 'exceptional' information. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:57, 21 December 2022 (UTC)
  • No: While the statement could do with with further supporting sources (I will add some), its claims is in no way 'exceptional', and no evidence suggests this. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:01, 21 December 2022 (UTC)
    The current state of the sourcing for the first statement is now accurately represented above under the subheading "Text with updated sourcing" - as MarioGom note below, the first statement is obviously well supported and should stay. The second statement is neither here nor there, with the Guardian piece hardly being the best of standalone sources. I would also like to see a more academic source for this, and am not, in principle, particularly opposed to its removal. (The wording of their protestations is not really a important detail at the end of the day.) Iskandar323 (talk) 10:03, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
  • NB: For reference purposes, I have provided a copy of the text above with the updated set of sources that are now present in the article (after additions). Iskandar323 (talk) 10:19, 21 December 2022 (UTC)
Iskandar323, don't WP:BLUDGEON the RFC please! (you made 5 different posts in a span of about an hour!) or delete sections (like you did by deleting the RFC Discussion section). You also added sources to the opening statement that don't address the RFC question (this RFC is not about adding sources to duplicated information). I've explained further in the section below. Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:28, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
Oh, I obviously didn't mean to delete the discussion section header - that was just me making a mistake as I added a new thread to the bottom of the page. On your other point, the availability of reliable sources to support the statement that you want to delete based on it having flimsy sourcing is of direct pertinence and obvious importance to the RFC. Honestly, it would have been better to simply have opened a normal sourcing discussion on this, or better still, for you to have simply searched for the quite freely available sources on this yourself. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:54, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
  • No: The first sentence seems to have enough sourcing. The second sentence sourcing is currently weak, so I'm not opposed to remove it unless there are more sources other than The Guardian Q&A (which is still good to support the first sentence). MarioGom (talk) 08:08, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
  • Yes: The first sentence effectively repeats content already in the article. Sourcing isn’t the problem with that sentence, but I can see how Iskandar323’s post in the section header would make that confusing for others. Sourcing is defo the problem with the second sentence (for which Iskandar323 did not provide any new sources even though in the section header he added "Text with updated sourcing:"). Poya-P (talk) 19:48, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
    @Poya-P: Where else is the first statement repeated in the article? The most similar alternative is: "It has also been suggested that the group supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1979." - a statement that currently misrepresents the source - which 'suggests' nothing, but declares it in no uncertain terms. If this is the statement you mean, I have already suggested merging the two bodies of material about the hostage crisis in the threat below. But by no means can we simply remove the statement that is correct and leave the one that isn't. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:17, 22 December 2022 (UTC)
  • No. It is not the first time that some users attribute false information to the reliable sources. Isn't there any way of stopping them from doing that? And the strange thing is that some other users use this false information to omit true/well sourced information from the article.Ghazaalch (talk) 05:51, 23 December 2022 (UTC)
  • Yes because the first sentence and its sources can be merged to existing content in the article ("It has also been suggested that the group supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1979"). Since there is also a denial by the group and also context for that denial, this information can be rewritten neutrally into something like "some sources claim X, while other sources claim Y". About the second sentence saying "surrender", it is 'exceptional' because is a delicate statement cited to a very poor source. NMasiha (talk) 18:02, 23 December 2022 (UTC)This user has been globally banned from editing Wikimedia sites.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:55, 21 January 2023 (UTC)

Discussion, 20 December 2022

Iskandar323 your proposal is unrelated to the RFC question which is about removing duplicated information and a WP:ECREE claim from a Q&A article. If you want to update the the Katzman and Abrahmian content, then let's have a look at that (I started a new section below). Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:28, 22 December 2022 (UTC)


Sources

  1. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 196. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The Mojahedin initially gave full support to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line who had taken over the US embassy
  2. ^ "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. 2011. The MEK used its increasing power to pressure the government into increasingly radical action—from more summary trials and executions to the occupation of the American embassy.
  3. ^ Mahan, Abedin. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies". despite its persistent and sophisticated denials today, the Mojahedin fully supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979.
  4. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1845192709. the organization's activities in overthrowing the Shah, its public support regarding the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran...
  5. ^ a b Fisher, Max (2 July 2012). "Here's the Video of Newt Gingrich Bowing to the Leader of an Iranian Terrorist Group". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
  6. ^ Cafarella, Nicole (15 March 2005). "Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier" (Document). p. 3. {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |work= ignored (help)
  7. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908, Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.
  8. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  9. ^ Limbert, John (2009). Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History. United States Institute of Peace. p. 104. By the end of the crisis, they had mobilized a network of support and driven their Iranian rivals, both moderates and leftists, into the political wilderness. They pushed the Mojahediin-e Khalq into open opposition beginning in 1980 and defeated them in bloody street battles in 1981-92
  10. ^ Basmenji, Kaveh (2005). Tehran Blues: Youth Culture in Iran. Saqui Books. ISBN 978-0863565823. Zealous militant students from Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan and Tabriz took part in seizing the American embassy... But at the same time, the students eyed the rival political groups that were trying hard to win the hearts and minds of the young generation, particularly the Mojahedin and the Marxist organizations. The takeover of the embassy, so to speak, practically out-lefted the most extreme left, and ideologically disarmed the competition, albeit temporarily
  11. ^ Kinch, Penelope (2016). The US-Iran Relationship: The Impact of Political Identity on Foreign Policy. I.B. Tauris. During the early stages of the hostage crisis Iranian universities closed, under what Khomeini termed a 'cultural revolution'. The intention was to alienate the support base for the communist Tudeh Party and the Mojahedin al-Khalq (MEK). These groups were particularly popular among the student population. Khomeini was also able to designate the failed hostage rescue mission of April 1980 as 'tangible evidence that the principal danger threatening the Iranian people was foreign intervention
  12. ^ "Hostage crisis anniversary highlights absence of change in Iran". UPI. Although supreme leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the MEK's role in 2018, he also blamed the protests on a "triangle" of enemies in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh. This reflects a longstanding strategy of conflating foreign and domestic opposition to the clerical regime, in hopes of directing supporters to reject both trends as one. The MEK traces this strategy all the way back to the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy when the new regime sought to exploit anti-Western sentiment by compelling hard-liners to line up behind the ayatollahs, thereby excluding alternative visions for Iran's future
  13. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology.
  14. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 208. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. In the political sphere, the Mojahedin attacked the regime for ... engineering the American hostage crisis to impose on the nation the 'medieval' concept of the velayat-e faqih. To support the last accusation they published articles revealing how the student hostage-takers were linked to the IRP; how the pasdars had facilitated the break-in; how those who had refused to toe the IRP line had been forced out of the compound; how Ayatollah Beheshti had used the whole incident to seep aside the Bazargan government; and how Hojjat al-Islam Khoiniha, the man appointed by Khomeini to advise the students, had carefully removed from the embassy all documents with references to US officials meeting clerical leaders during the 1979 revolution.
  15. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  16. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  17. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages .
  18. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 196. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The Mojahedin initially gave full support to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line who had taken over the US embassy
  19. ^ "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. 2011. The MEK used its increasing power to pressure the government into increasingly radical action—from more summary trials and executions to the occupation of the American embassy.
  20. ^ Mahan, Abedin. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies". despite its persistent and sophisticated denials today, the Mojahedin fully supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979.
  21. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1845192709. the organization's activities in overthrowing the Shah, its public support regarding the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran...
  22. ^ Cafarella, Nicole (15 March 2005). "Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier" (Document). p. 3. {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |work= ignored (help)
  23. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908, Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.
  24. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages .
  25. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 11 September 2018. The MEK was an enthusiastic supporter of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran following the Iranian revolution. It called the eventual release of the American hostages a "surrender"
  26. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology.
  27. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  28. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  29. ^ Fisher, Max (2 July 2012). "Here's the Video of Newt Gingrich Bowing to the Leader of an Iranian Terrorist Group". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
  30. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  31. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 208. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  32. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908

Updating the content by Ervand Abrahamian and Kenneth Katzman

It's been suggested that the following content in the article should be updated.

It has also been suggested that the group supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1979.[1] According to Ervand Abrahamian and Kenneth Katzman, the MEK "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents"."[2][3]

In analysis of the three sources, this is what Max Fisher (the Atlantic article) writes.

Other than this one uncomfortable moment, Gingrich's visit seemed to go well. He did, however, open his speech by citing the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis, in which Iran held American embassy officials hostage for over a year, as the first strike against the U.S. and as proof of the "intolerable" and "anti-human rights" nature of the regime. "We will never have peace and we will never have justice in the region as long as that dictatorship survives," he concluded. What he didn't seem to know is that his host, the MEK, had supported and participated in holding the Americans hostage, which is part of how they got the terrorist designation that Gingrich would like to see removed.

This is what Ervand Abrahamian writes.

In the political sphere, the Mojahedin attacked the regime for ... engineering the American hostage crisis to impose on the nation the 'medieval' concept of the velayat-e faqih. To support the last accusation they published articles revealing how the student hostage-takers were linked to the IRP; how the pasdars had facilitated the break-in; how those who had refused to toe the IRP line had been forced out of the compound; how Ayatollah Beheshti had used the whole incident to seep aside the Bazargan government; and how Hojjat al-Islam Khoiniha, the man appointed by Khomeini to advise the students, had carefully removed from the embassy all documents with references to US officials meeting clerical leaders during the 1979 revolution.

This is what Kenneth Katzman writes.

According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents, including its official paper Mojahed, the PMOI supported the November 4, 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages. (The takeover itself was conducted primarily by Islamic radicals close to Khomeini, according to most accounts). The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology.

Iskandar323 is also suggesting that we should look at two additional sources:

  • st.nejatngo.org/file/Book_EN/CPT_MKO_Dossier.pdf[4] About this source, I'm a bit uncomfortable with using a dossier hosted in a shady website like nejatngo.org.
  • "Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action."[5]

Let's see what other reliable sources are found to better understand where we're at with this content. Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:28, 22 December 2022 (UTC)

Yes, so what we have above is a combination of reliable, secondary sources stating that the MEK was involved, as well as sources stating that the MEK has denied being involved - those are the two clear facts. No source seems to state that the MEK was not involved, only that the MEK says that. The 'Dossier' is published by the Center for Policing Terrorism. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:15, 24 December 2022 (UTC)

Iskandar323, Why would you suggest that?

We have two historians saying "In the political sphere, the Mojahedin attacked the regime for ... engineering the American hostage crisis to impose on the nation the 'medieval' concept of the velayat-e faqih." and "The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI."

We have other sources supporting that the MEK denied the accusations.

According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West [4]

Then there are plenty of sources supporting that the regime used the hostage crisis to crush the opposition (including the MEK), which supports the MEK claim.

In this case, the short-term gain was the opportunity for an extreme religious faction within the revolutionary coalition to use the embassy occupation to crush its opponents... They denounced their Iranian opponents and anyone who questioned the takeover as liberals and compromisers who were ready to sell out Iran's interest to foreigners... In one sense, in the short-term extremists' strategy of exploiting the takeover for domestic political purposes was successful. By the end of the crisis, they had mobilized a network of support and driven their Iranian rivals, both moderates and leftists, into the political wilderness. They pushed the Mojahediin-e Khalq into open opposition beginning in 1980 and defeated them in bloody street battles in 1981-92. [5]

Although supreme leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the MEK's role in 2018, he also blamed the protests on a "triangle" of enemies in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh. This reflects a longstanding strategy of conflating foreign and domestic opposition to the clerical regime, in hopes of directing supporters to reject both trends as one. The MEK traces this strategy all the way back to the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy when the new regime sought to exploit anti-Western sentiment by compelling hard-liners to line up behind the ayatollahs, thereby excluding alternative visions for Iran's future [6]

The hostage crisis was significant as a unity measure at a critical time for the revolution. The Islamist camp was particularly concerned about the growing support for the leftist movement. During the early stages of the hostage crisis Iranian universities closed, under what Khomeini termed a 'cultural revolution'. The intention was to alienate the support base for the communist Tudeh Party and the Mojahedin al-Khalq (MEK). These groups were particularly popular among the student population. Khomeini was also able to designate the failed hostage rescue mission of April 1980 as 'tangible evidence that the principal danger threatening the Iranian people was foreign intervention [7]

Zealous militant students from Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan and Tabriz took part in seizing the American embassy... But at the same time, the students eyed the rival political groups that were trying hard to win the hearts and minds of the young generation, particularly the Mojahedin and the Marxist organizations. The takeover of the embassy, so to speak, practically out-lefted the most extreme left, and ideologically disarmed the competition, albeit temporarily. [8]

Fad Ariff (talk) 12:58, 23 December 2022 (UTC)

The MEK "attacking" the regime for something does not preclude them from having supporting the same something at a different point in timne. "The groups says..." is never something that can be quoted in Wikivoice - only something that can be attributed. Flipping and flopping between different political positions based on the mood of the day is just good public relations. It's not exactly surprising that the MEK would want to distance itself from the hostage crisis (the main cause of bad blood between the US and Iran) when it's begging US political figures for support. Likewise, that the regime successfully used the hostage crisis to alienate leftist groups like the MEK just means that they were political outmaneuvered; it does not reflect on whether they were initially involved in it. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:39, 24 December 2022 (UTC)
I understand that you have a personal viewpoint regarding the issue, but these sources provide context about the hostage crisis and how it was used against the MEK, and so they're relevant.
I would update the Abrahamian and Katzman sources to "In 1979, the Iran hostage crisis was used to push out rival political groups,[6][7] with Khomeini closing down universities (in what he termed to be a 'cultural revolution') as means to alienate the support base for the MEK.[8][9] It has been suggested that the MEK supported the U.S. embassy takeover. According to the MEK, it "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents," including the MEK.[10][11][12][13]" Fad Ariff (talk) 13:07, 27 December 2022 (UTC)
My personal opinion doesn't come into it. ALL reliable sources concur that the MEK supported the hostage taking. SOME sources also note that the MEK claimed it did not. NO sources state that the MEK did not support the hostage taking. This statement: "It has been suggested that the MEK supported the U.S. embassy takeover." - is therefore not factually correct and directly contradicts the reliable secondary sources. The MEK's involvement has not been 'suggested', it is stated as fact in reliable sources and not contradicted by any reliable sources. The MEK's protestations that this is not true are just that: protestations. That these protestations are documented in reliable sources means that we can also include a note on this - as with the other statements above: these can all be included as context and analysis, but only after the actual factual statement that the MEK are recorded by reliable sources as having supported the hostage taking. Iskandar323 (talk) 18:41, 27 December 2022 (UTC)
So let’s make that adjustment then to "In 1979, the Iran hostage crisis was used to push out rival political groups,[6][7] with Khomeini closing down universities (in what he termed to be a 'cultural revolution') as means to alienate the support base for the MEK.[8][9] The MEK supported the U.S. embassy takeover, although according to the MEK, it "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents," including the MEK.[10][11][12][13]" Fad Ariff (talk) 13:10, 28 December 2022 (UTC)
I'm not sure why you've moved this back into the RFC, because it is not part of it. The various additions above don't just need an adjustment, they need careful thought. For one thing, as I've already mentioned above, the analysis is secondary to the facts of the MEK's involvement. The sources themselves insist upon this, e.g. The Limbert source begins: "By the end of the crisis... - information that only finds context at 'the end of the crisis'. Secondly, much of this material is simplistically paraphrased. The phrase that states that the crisis "was used to push out rival political groups", for example, is vague to say the least - used by who? One cited quote does not present an actor, while the other mentions students. The statement about Khomeini closing universities is much more grounded, although it needs to retain the context of the source: "During the early stages of the hostage crisis... " For the last statement, I don't understand what purpose the other three sources backfilling the Katzman quote are supposed to serve. The quoted text is a pure quote from Katzman, and none of the other sources quote Katzman. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:58, 28 December 2022 (UTC)
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Post-RFC discussion

The consensus was to "RETAIN SENTENCE 1 WITH ADDITIONAL CITATIONS; REMOVE SENTENCE 2; DISCUSS FURTHER EXPANSION".

Sentence 1 is "The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution. (kept), sentence 2 is "MEK described the eventual release of the American hostages a "surrender"" (removed), and the sentence that Iskandar added to the article ("and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages") doesn't form part of this consensus, so it will be removed. I would add that there are plenty of sources supporting that the regime used the hostage crisis to crush the opposition (including the MEK), and that should be added as well. @Iskandar323: I'm also concerned about how you've arranged the sources in the article. For example, why did you change Katzman's source as "Katzman-excuse"?Fad Ariff (talk) 12:02, 29 March 2023 (UTC)

Multiple different ref names were required to contain the repeated harvnb format citations with embedded quotes. Basic referencing stuff. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:24, 29 March 2023 (UTC)
I'm afraid you've also introduced a false balance. As the material stood, there were four sentences, two reliably attesting what the MEK did, and two providing their protestations to the contrary (an already more than generous arrangement). You have removed one of the former while leaving all of the latter intact. Unless the other Katzman part is to stay in, then frankly the other Katzman quote can also go in the bin to return it to one independent statement plus one MEK claim/counter-protestation. Likewise, there isn't going to be space for any more MEK claims unless the version of events as it is established in independent sources is given some room to breath. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:19, 29 March 2023 (UTC)

Fixing false-balance (WP:RFCBEFORE)

Currently we have the following in the article:

  • The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution.[14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21] The MEK has denied this, asserting that the association was the result of misinformation aimed at discrediting it in the West.[22][23] According to Kenneth Katzman, the MEK claimed that it "could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as [an] excuse to eliminate its internal opponents".[22][24]

I propose changing it to the following:

  • The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution,[25][26][27][28][29][19][30][31] and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages.[32][33] MEK has denied the charges.[34][35][36]

This article Is about what MEK has done, not what MEK has said in denying what it has done. MEK is even denying its own official paper Mojahed. Katzaman writes: According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages . So quoting MEK’s denial (noted by Katzman) instead of the fact given by Katzman is WP:POVPUSH and WP:CHERRYPICKING. Besides, this article is already too long and we should make it shorter.Ghazaalch (talk) 07:33, 30 March 2023 (UTC)

The fact presented above by several sources contains 20 words, while the denial claimed by Mojahedin-e Khalq contains 52 words. It should be fixed as suggested above.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 19:28, 14 April 2023 (UTC)
@Fad Ariff: I am going to implement the changes if there is no objection. Ghazaalch (talk) 10:08, 15 April 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch: since this article is about the MEK, I don't agree that deleting their views is WP:POVPUSH and WP:CHERRYPICKING. The information is taken from reliable sources, and it's short and informative. I'm reverting your last edit on that basis. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:20, 19 April 2023 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Fisher, Max (2 July 2012). "Here's the Video of Newt Gingrich Bowing to the Leader of an Iranian Terrorist Group". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
  2. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  3. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 208. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  4. ^ Cafarella, Nicole (15 March 2005). "Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier" (Document). p. 3. {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |work= ignored (help)
  5. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908, Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.
  6. ^ Limbert, John (2009). Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History. United States Institute of Peace. p. 104. By the end of the crisis, they had mobilized a network of support and driven their Iranian rivals, both moderates and leftists, into the political wilderness. They pushed the Mojahediin-e Khalq into open opposition beginning in 1980 and defeated them in bloody street battles in 1981-92
  7. ^ Basmenji, Kaveh (2005). Tehran Blues: Youth Culture in Iran. Saqui Books. ISBN 978-0863565823. Zealous militant students from Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan and Tabriz took part in seizing the American embassy... But at the same time, the students eyed the rival political groups that were trying hard to win the hearts and minds of the young generation, particularly the Mojahedin and the Marxist organizations. The takeover of the embassy, so to speak, practically out-lefted the most extreme left, and ideologically disarmed the competition, albeit temporarily
  8. ^ Kinch, Penelope (2016). The US-Iran Relationship: The Impact of Political Identity on Foreign Policy. I.B. Tauris. During the early stages of the hostage crisis Iranian universities closed, under what Khomeini termed a 'cultural revolution'. The intention was to alienate the support base for the communist Tudeh Party and the Mojahedin al-Khalq (MEK). These groups were particularly popular among the student population. Khomeini was also able to designate the failed hostage rescue mission of April 1980 as 'tangible evidence that the principal danger threatening the Iranian people was foreign intervention
  9. ^ "Hostage crisis anniversary highlights absence of change in Iran". UPI. Although supreme leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the MEK's role in 2018, he also blamed the protests on a "triangle" of enemies in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh. This reflects a longstanding strategy of conflating foreign and domestic opposition to the clerical regime, in hopes of directing supporters to reject both trends as one. The MEK traces this strategy all the way back to the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy when the new regime sought to exploit anti-Western sentiment by compelling hard-liners to line up behind the ayatollahs, thereby excluding alternative visions for Iran's future
  10. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology.
  11. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 208. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. In the political sphere, the Mojahedin attacked the regime for ... engineering the American hostage crisis to impose on the nation the 'medieval' concept of the velayat-e faqih. To support the last accusation they published articles revealing how the student hostage-takers were linked to the IRP; how the pasdars had facilitated the break-in; how those who had refused to toe the IRP line had been forced out of the compound; how Ayatollah Beheshti had used the whole incident to seep aside the Bazargan government; and how Hojjat al-Islam Khoiniha, the man appointed by Khomeini to advise the students, had carefully removed from the embassy all documents with references to US officials meeting clerical leaders during the 1979 revolution.
  12. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  13. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  14. ^ Katzman 2001, p. 100: According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents, including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages. harvnb error: multiple targets (14×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  15. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 196: The Mojahedin initially gave full support to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line who had taken over the US embassy. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  16. ^ "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. 2011. The MEK used its increasing power to pressure the government into increasingly radical action—from more summary trials and executions to the occupation of the American embassy.
  17. ^ Mahan, Abedin. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies". despite its persistent and sophisticated denials today, the Mojahedin fully supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979.
  18. ^ Cohen 2009, the organization’s activities in overthrowing the Shah, its public support regarding the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran.... sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFCohen2009 (help)
  19. ^ a b Fisher, Max (2 July 2012). "Here's the Video of Newt Gingrich Bowing to the Leader of an Iranian Terrorist Group". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
  20. ^ Cafarella, Nicole (15 March 2005). "Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier" (Document). p. 3. {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |work= ignored (help)
  21. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908, Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.
  22. ^ a b Katzman 2001, p. 100: The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as [an] excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology. harvnb error: multiple targets (14×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  23. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  24. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  25. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages .
  26. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 196. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The Mojahedin initially gave full support to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line who had taken over the US embassy
  27. ^ "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. 2011. The MEK used its increasing power to pressure the government into increasingly radical action—from more summary trials and executions to the occupation of the American embassy.
  28. ^ Mahan, Abedin. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies". despite its persistent and sophisticated denials today, the Mojahedin fully supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979.
  29. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1845192709. the organization's activities in overthrowing the Shah, its public support regarding the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran...
  30. ^ Cafarella, Nicole (15 March 2005). "Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier" (Document). p. 3. {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |work= ignored (help)
  31. ^ Clark, Mark Edmond (2016), "An Analysis of the Role of the Iranian Diaspora in the Financial Support System of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalid", in David Gold (ed.), Microeconomics, Routledge, pp. 66–67, ISBN 978-1317045908, Following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the MEK participated physically at the site by assisting in defending it from attack. The MEK also offered strong political support for the hostage-taking action.
  32. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. According to eyewitnesses and PMOI documents , including its official paper Mojahed , the PMOI supported the November 4 , 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and reportedly argued against the early release of the hostages .
  33. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 11 September 2018. The MEK was an enthusiastic supporter of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran following the Iranian revolution. It called the eventual release of the American hostages a "surrender"
  34. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. The PMOI claims it could not have supported the hostage taking because the regime used the hostage crises as excuse to eliminate its internal opponents, including the PMOI. The hostage crisis brought down the government of the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and the clerics quickly worked to monopolize power and institute clerical rule in line with Khomeini's ideology.
  35. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West
  36. ^ Boon, Kristen (2012). Global Stability and U.S. National Security. Oxford University Press. p. 317. According to past State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group in the West

RFC, Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage

No result. Closing as out of process. No actionable question is being asked here. WP:PROPORTION is policy, and no RfC is needed to follow it; but obviously the disagreement is going to be about how to follow it, and this RfC offers nothing in that respect. I recommend proposing a new version on this talk page, workshopping it so it has at least a little support beyond the OP, and then putting the specific test through an RfC. Vanamonde (Talk) 21:51, 14 April 2023 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Should the content about Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage be removed and then re-written per WP:PROPORTION? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:02, 10 April 2023 (UTC)

You haven't specified the material in question or your proposed changes - how is that a yes/no? Iskandar323 (talk) 19:39, 10 April 2023 (UTC)

Survey

Yes. Because that content is currently cited to only one source with cherrypicked lines, which is a violation of WP:PROPORTION, WP:NPOV, and WP:CHERRYPICKING. The author of the current content (Ervand Abrahamian) actually writes varied information about Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage, but that has not been represented in the article. Moreover, there are different sources giving different views about this material (which have also been omitted). This material should represent more than a single POV, so I propose removing the current material and replacing it with whatever alternative version receives consensus. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:06, 10 April 2023 (UTC)

  • *Yes. I don't have much background on this subject, but this isn't complicated. Information should be represented proportionately through all the significant views from reliable sources. It's policy. ParadaJulio (talk) 09:24, 11 April 2023 (UTC)

Proposals for replacing this material

In case it receives consensus, the following is how I suggest Maryam Rajavi's marriage and divorce material should be covered in the article.

For some Iranians, the marriage institution was being used as a means to challenge "unjust organization orders" at the time in Iran. For MEK members, Maryam Rajavi's divorce became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages.[1] According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate the ideological revolution. This was signified as an "act of supreme sacrifice designed to promote collective leadership and appeal to the female half of the Iranian populace." This was both criticized and praised according to different reports.[2]

Fad Ariff (talk) 12:08, 12 April 2023 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Saeidi, Shirin (2022). Women and the Islamic Republic: How Gendered Citizenship Conditions the Iranian State (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 66). Cambridge University Press. p. 127.
  2. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

@Vanamonde93: My actionable question was meant to be about if this content about Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage should be removed and then re-written. Was that too vague? I've been trying for weeks to make that material a bit more neutral following. This RFC was meant to at least allow modification of that material (and I also made a proposal). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:24, 17 April 2023 (UTC)

It's more than vague, it's meaningless. The pertinent question is what you would put in a rewrite, and that's the question you really need outside input on, because that's what everyone watching this page will disagree on. So write a proposal, workshop it a little bit, and then open an RfC if you need to. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:06, 17 April 2023 (UTC)
@Vanamonde93: I have already tried workshoping, and a second time. There is a WP:PROPORTION problem with that material and any attempt to modify it is being reverted, so the RFC was an attempt to at least establish there is a problem so that it can actually be fixed (otherwise any attempts to fix it will continue to be stonewalled as they've been so far). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:09, 18 April 2023 (UTC)
I feel like I'm repeating myself, but the RFC you wrote would solve nothing. You need consensus on a proposed change regardless; even unanimous agreement on the need for a change would not get you closer. Vanamonde (Talk) 15:23, 18 April 2023 (UTC)

RFC 25 February 2023

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.
Withdrawn by proposer and replaced by next RFC. MarioGom (talk) 18:15, 7 May 2023 (UTC)

Currently we have the following sentences related to the events of 1981 in lede:

  • By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground.[1][2]
  • In June 1981, the MEK organized the 20 June 1981 Iranian protests against the Islamic Republic in support of president Abolhassan Banisadr, claiming that the Islamic Republic had carried out a secret coup d'état.[3][4] Afterwards, the government arrested and executed numerous MEK members and sympathizers.[5][6][7] As the Iran regime started to clamp down on civil and human rights, the MEK initiated attacks targeting the clerical leadership that lasted until 1982.[8][9]

Should we replace them with:

Yes or No? Ghazaalch (talk) 09:13, 25 February 2023 (UTC)

Survey, 25 February 2023

  • Yes the main events of the 1981 as attested by many scholarly sources are the Assassinations allegedly done by MEK, but there is no coverage of them in the lede. Of course, there are some sources that mention other suspects besides the MEK, but most of the sources consider MEK responsible for the bombings. For more information see above discussion:1981 events in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE). Ghazaalch (talk) 09:13, 25 February 2023 (UTC)
  • No. The lead's original version is a more accurate review of the academic literature and the article's sections. Also cherrypicked allegations is not something for the lead. Looking at those pages about the bombings for example the only things that seem beyond doubt is that "Khomeini blamed the MEK, which didn't take credit but also never denied responsibility"[30], and that the bombings "were shocking displays of the regime's faulty security and infiltration by foes".[31] The sources in those articles also attest that "It is possible, as Claude Van England notes, that those who planted the bombs were assisted by the Mujaahideen though they were not actually members of the organization. Much of the expertise involved was thus not necessarily that of the old Mujahideen, but may have been the product of collective efforts with other opponents of the regime."[32] Also that "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombing may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, including current iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rasanjani, to rid themselves of rivals with the IRP"[33] Abrahamian also says "Even now it is not clear who planted the bomb", and that "SAVAK", "the Iraqi regime", "the Mojahedin", "Iraqi agents", "Mehdi Tafari", "royalist army officers" were all either charged or accused.[34] Another source also attests that "the bomb explosion in Tehran on 30 August 1981 - which killed Muhammad Ali Rajai, the newly elected president of the IRI, as well as prime minister Muhammad Javad Bahunar - was attributed to the United States and its local agents."[35] We also already had a conclusive RFC about part of what Ghazaalch wants to remove from the lead a few months ago. Fad Ariff (talk) 10:01, 25 February 2023 (UTC)

Discussion, 25 February 2023

@Ghazaalch: what is your brief and neutral statement? At over 13,000 bytes, the statement above (from the {{rfc}} tag to the next timestamp) is far too long for Legobot (talk · contribs) to handle, and so it is not being shown correctly at Wikipedia:Requests for comment/. The RfC may also not be publicised through WP:FRS until a shorter statement is provided. --Redrose64 🌹 (talk) 16:48, 25 February 2023 (UTC)


Thank you Redrose64. I started a new RFC below. See if it is okay now? Ghazaalch (talk) 18:05, 25 February 2023 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 206. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ "Making Sense of The MeK". National Interest. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  3. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  4. ^ Svensson, Isak (2013). Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars. ISBN 978-0702249563. On 20 June 1981, MEK organized a peaceful demonstration attended by up to 50 000 participants, who advanced towards parliament. Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards opened fire, which resulted in 50 deaths, 200 injured, and 1 000 arrested in the area around Tehran University
  5. ^ Katzman 2001, pp. 98–101. sfn error: multiple targets (14×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 36, 218, 219. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference auto7 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74. ISBN 978-0-19-049170-3. Unsurprisingly, the decision to fight alongside Saddam was viewed as traitorous by the vast majority of Iranians and destroyed the MKO's standing in its homeland.
  9. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (12×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  10. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime.
  11. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest of half a million people in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution… 50 demonstrators were killed, with 200 wounded. Banisadr was removed from office...
  12. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. On June 20, 1981, the PMPI held a major anti-Khomeini demonstration that turned into an armed confrontation in which the PMOI was badly defeated.
  13. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  14. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system.
  15. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. pp. 79–80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
  16. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
  17. ^ Colgan, Jeff (31 January 2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press 2013. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-107-02967-5.
  18. ^ S. Ismael, Jacqueline; Perry, Glenn; Y. Ismael, Tareq (5 October 2015). Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and change. Routledge (2015). p. 181. ISBN 978-1-317-66283-9.
  19. ^ Newton, Michael (17 April 2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO (2014). p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  20. ^ Pedde, Nicola. "ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MOJAHEDIN E-KA". ojs.uniroma1.
  21. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
  22. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris
  23. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime
  24. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982 , most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  25. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  27. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 9781610692861. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  28. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  29. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  30. ^ O'Hern, Steven K. (2012). Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps. Potomac Books. p. 32. ISBN 978-1-59797-823-1.
  31. ^ Amanat, Abbas (2019). Iran: A Modern History. Yale University Press. p. 803.
  32. ^ Ram, Haggay (Summer 1992). "Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran". Middle East Journal. 46 (3): 426–439. JSTOR 42763892.
  33. ^ Kenneth Katzman (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Albert V. Benliot (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova Publishers. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  34. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  35. ^ Pirseyedi, Bobi (2017). Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Routledge. p. 190.
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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