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Prices in mixed cost allocation problems. (English) Zbl 1027.91045

The problem under consideration is the dividing of the cost of consumption of a finite number of goods, some of which are divisible and another indivisible. This cost allocation problem (cap) is reformulated as a cooperative game with transferable utility. The paper’s goal is an extension of the Aumann-Shapley price rule that was created for nonatomic games. Such games are corresponding to ca problems with divisible goods. The authors’ extension of the AS price rule on the mixed cap is based on the theory of mixed multilevel (on players participation) games considered by them earlier. The main results are a formula for a generalized AS price rule for mixed cap and seven axioms which are the characterization of the rule.

MSC:

91B32 Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B24 Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A12 Cooperative games

References:

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