Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games. (English) Zbl 0751.90089
Summary: Because the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is too strict in asymmetric games, the more general limit ESS concept was proposed by Selten. This paper provides a characterization of the limit ESS concept, showing that a strategy profile is a limit ESS if and only if it is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in strategies which are not weakly dominated and which satisfy an additional condition called absence of role-equivalent strategies. We also briefly explore, in the context of examples, the properties of the limit ESS concept.
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