Is there a bias toward excessive quality in defense procurement? (English) Zbl 1005.91090
Summary: Anecdotal evidence suggests that defense procurement processes lead to the purchase of weapons of apparently excessive quality. In this paper, we present a model that suggests that this could be the result of the timing and informational structure of procurement decisions.
MSC:
| 91F10 | History, political science |
References:
| [1] | Gansler, J., The Defense Industry (1980), MIT Press: MIT Press Cambridge, MA |
| [2] | Rogerson, W., Quantity vs. quality in military procurement, American Economic Review, 80, 83-92 (1990) |
| [3] | Stubbing, R., The Defense Game (1986), Harper and Row: Harper and Row New York |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
