Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas. (English) Zbl 0953.91012
Summary: We consider auctions assuming bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. Standard auctions are efficient, yet reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum. Finally we sketch the impact of information spillovers.
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
References:
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