Pre vs. Post-award subcontracting plans in procurement bidding. (English) Zbl 1254.91235
Summary: We show how the timing of the subcontracting decision affects subcontracting levels, bidding strategies and expected total cost of procurement contracts, considering that bidders face a trade-off between subcontracting rents and expected change orders when choosing the subcontracting level.
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
| 91B40 | Labor market, contracts (MSC2010) |
References:
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