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Presentism and black holes. (English) Zbl 1384.83029

Summary: In a recent publication [ibid. 4, No. 3, 293–308 (2014; Zbl 1319.83016)] G. E. Romero and D. Pérez claim to reveal new trouble for the already difficult life of presentism in relativistic spacetimes. Their argument purports to demonstrate the impossibility of postulating a viable present in the presence of black holes, in particular the Schwarzschild geometries. I argue that their argument is flawed, and that the Schwarzschild geometries they consider offer no novel threats to presentism. However, if we consider more general black holes, different and more potent threats may be lurking in the dark. I discuss these threats and sketch how a presentist may respond, thus painting a more balanced picture of the way the existence of black holes might impact presentist metaphysics. At present there is no decisive verdict from black holes, but it turns out a close scrutiny of the developments in the relevant physics will be needed to see whether their import will remain so inconclusive.

MSC:

83C57 Black holes
83C05 Einstein’s equations (general structure, canonical formalism, Cauchy problems)
03A10 Logic in the philosophy of science
83A05 Special relativity

Citations:

Zbl 1319.83016

References:

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