Sociality is a mechanism for collective action dilemma resolution. (English) Zbl 1533.91202
Olenev, Nicholas (ed.) et al., Advances in optimization and applications. 11th international conference, OPTIMA 2020, Moscow, Russia, September 28 – October 2, 2020. Revised selected papers. Cham: Springer. Commun. Comput. Inf. Sci. 1340, 145-157 (2020).
Summary: Numerous studies (mostly in economics) address the issue of collective action dilemmas for public goods, but few focus on psychological factors that affect individual decisions, and can be instrumental in designing effective mechanisms of public good provision. This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments where “human sociality” is used as key variable in public goods type games. We show that once social ties have been formed (even after short-term socialization) among group members, it facilitates strategies that lead to much higher rates of public goods provision, and, thus make collective action a success. Moreover, the amount of participants who choose individual strategies decreases in two times. That is, it solves the common problem of free-riders because participants begin to exhibit more socially responsible character. We also demonstrate that results hold in situations that involve risk, and females tend to be better contributors to public goods than their male counterparts.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1515.90011].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1515.90011].
MSC:
| 91B18 | Public goods |
Software:
Z-TreeReferences:
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