Time to complete and research joint ventures: a differential game approach. (English) Zbl 1201.91016
Summary: We analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of research joint ventures (RJVs). We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function of R&D activities. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that R&D projects take time to complete shows that benefits from cooperation in R&D not only allow RJVs to carry out larger R&D projects, but also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and, consequently, to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with the innovation.
MSC:
| 91A23 | Differential games (aspects of game theory) |
| 49N70 | Differential games and control |
| 91B38 | Production theory, theory of the firm |
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
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