Publisher’s description: This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for non-transferable utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine noncooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
Reviewer’s remarks: The book looks very originally. It contains several new topics like games in partition function form, bargaining power biform games, intertemporal cooperative games and a theory of enterprise, not present in the standard books on game theory. Besides it gives many philosophy, interpretations, intuitions and examples, very useful and desired by the readers. But unfortunately, the book is written very badly and contains many mistakes and unclear definitions.