Shapley value of homogeneous cooperative games. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1519.91022
Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 63, No. 3, 450-465 (2023); translation from Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz. 63, No. 3, 474-490 (2023).
The author considered a special linear operator (Shapley value). The main interest of the results are on computational aspects. He presented integral representations of the Shapley value considering that the game has a finite or an infinite number of players. a new rule is derived as products of non-atomic probability measures. The proposed approach to the study of the Shapley value of homogeneous cooperative games is the systematic use of extensions of the considered polynomial set functions to the corresponding measures on the symmetric powers of the original measurable spaces.
Reviewer: Carlos Narciso Bouza Herrera (Habana)
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
Keywords:
Shapley value; Shapley functional; homogeneous cooperative game; polar form of homogeneous game; \(v\)-integralReferences:
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