Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results. (English) Zbl 1167.91354
Summary: Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design [ibid. 33, No. 2, 83–130 (2008; Zbl 1167.91353)], we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory.
Citations:
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