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Establishing human connections: experimental evidence from the helping game. (English) Zbl 1522.91068

Summary: This article studies human connections by examining the helping game – a hybrid between the classic two-player and multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. In the helping game, players are presented with a pool of heterogeneous players and have to decide whom to help, if any. Helping others is associated with a cost unique to each potential partner, and receiving help is associated with a fixed benefit. An economic experiment was conducted with 100 students to analyse under which circumstances partnerships (defined as both helping each other) develop in the game. The findings indicate that partnerships form in the game, although mainly when providing help is relatively cheap for both parties. Therefore, most partnerships are between lower helping-cost players, while higher helping-cost players struggle to form partnerships. In addition, establishing partnerships is easier when players meet potential partners consecutively rather than simultaneously, as long as helping others is not too costly. Moreover, less risk-tolerant subjects provide more help to reduce the risk of not forming partnerships, yet establish fewer partnerships, as less risk-tolerant players avoid helping others when it is costly.

MSC:

91A90 Experimental studies
91D30 Social networks; opinion dynamics

Software:

G*Power 3; Z-Tree
Full Text: DOI

References:

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