Simple and efficient password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. (English) Zbl 1294.94100
Summary: Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are cryptographic primitives which enable two entities, who only share a memorable password, to identify each other and to communicate over a public unreliable network with a secure session key. In this paper, we propose a simple, efficient and provably secure PAKE protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and cryptographic hash function. Our protocol is secure against dictionary attacks. Its security is proved based on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model.
MSC:
| 94A62 | Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing |
| 94A60 | Cryptography |
| 68M12 | Network protocols |
References:
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