Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency? (English) Zbl 1411.91170
Summary: Ultimata bargaining experimentally investigates the responder behavior for multiple proposers, that is, the responder’s decision to accept or reject an offer conditional on another parallel offer. Responders’ strategies combine the two formally independent but parallel games as if inducing competition among proposers by more frequently rejecting an offer when it is the lower one of the two offers received simultaneously. Furthermore, proposers’ public offers strongly correlate, due to adapting over repetitions to the parallel offer or because of only slightly outbidding the other proposer’s offer if known before their own announcement. Social preferences of inequity aversion or of pure altruism for income distributions resulting from simultaneous ultimata cannot explain a positive dependency of own offers on other parallel offers, and joint responsibility is proposed as a reference-dependent social motive.
MSC:
| 91A90 | Experimental studies |
| 91A20 | Multistage and repeated games |
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
Keywords:
multiple ultimatum game; context dependency; responder rejection rate; joint responsibility; comparative dependencySoftware:
Z-TreeReferences:
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