×
O’Hara, Kieron; Reichgelt, Han; Shadbolt, Nigel

Avoiding omnidoxasticity in logics of belief: A reply to MacPherson. (English) Zbl 0850.03017

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 36, No. 3, 475-495 (1995).

Cited in 3 Documents

MSC:

03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03B60 Other nonclassical logic
68T27 Logic in artificial intelligence
03B45 Modal logic (including the logic of norms)
Cite Review PDF
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Aitken, J. S., H. Reichgelt and N. Shadbolt, “Resolution theorem proving in reified modal logics,” Journal of Automated Reasoning , vol. 12 (1994), pp. 103–129. · Zbl 0810.03009 · doi:10.1007/BF00881845
[2] Ballim, A., and Y. Wilks, Artificial Believers: The Ascription of Belief , Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1991.
[3] Barwise, J., and J. Perry, Situations and Attitudes , M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1983. · Zbl 0946.03007
[4] Bledsoe, W., The UT Interactive Theorem Prover , Technical Paper ATP-17B, University of Austin, 1983.
[5] Clocksin, W., and R. Mellish, Programming in Prolog , Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981. · Zbl 0466.68009
[6] Corlett, R., N. Davies, R. Khan, H. Reichgelt and F. van Harmelen, “The architecture of Socrates,” pp. 135–164 in Logic-Based Knowledge Representation , edited by P. Jackson, H. Reichgelt, and F. van Harmelen, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1989.
[7] Dennett, D. C., The Intentional Stance , M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1987.
[8] Fagin, R., and R. Halpern, “Belief, awareness and limited reasoning,” pp. 491–501 in Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 1985 , Morgan Kaufman, San Mateo, 1985. · Zbl 0634.03013 · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(87)90003-8
[9] Genesereth, M., R. Greiner and D. Smith, MRS Manual , Memo HPP-80-24, Stanford University, 1980.
[10] Harman, G., Change in View , M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1986. · Zbl 0602.10042
[11] Hintikka, J., Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions , Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962. · Zbl 1085.03001
[12] Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
[13] Konolige, K., A Deduction Model of Belief , Pitman, London, 1986. · Zbl 0683.68080
[14] Levesque, H., “A logic of implicit and explicit belief,” pp. 198–202 in Proceedings of AAAI-84 , Morgan Kaufman, San Mateo, 1984.
[15] MacPherson, B., “Is it possible that belief isn’t necessary?” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , vol. 34 (1993), pp. 12–28. · Zbl 0800.03008 · doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093634560
[16] Reichgelt, H., Knowledge Representation: An AI Perspective , Ablex, Norwood, 1991.
[17] Rescher, N., Studies in Modality , Blackwell, Oxford, 1973. · Zbl 0259.02019
[18] Silverman, B. G., “Critiquing human judgment via knowledge acquisition systems,” AI Magazine , vol. 11 (1990), pp. 60–79.
[19] Williamson, T., “Some admissible rules in nonnormal modal systems,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , vol. 34 (1993), pp. 378–400 · Zbl 0803.03008 · doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093634728
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.