An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory. (English) Zbl 1125.91306
Summary: This article introduces the articles contained in the symposium on behavioral game theory. I break economic experiments studying game theory into three broad classes: \((1)\) experiments studying and possibly modifying the assumptions that serve as foundations for game theory; \((2)\) experiments that perform economic engineering, testing existing institutions with the aim of designing better ones; and \((3)\) experiments designed to test theories which apply game theory to fields such as industrial organization.
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
| 91-06 | Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance |
| 00B15 | Collections of articles of miscellaneous specific interest |
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