Combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version in a mixed duopoly. (English) Zbl 1408.91144
Summary: This paper extends [the second author, Econ. Lett. 120, No. 3, 364–368 (2013; Zbl 1284.91346)] concept combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version from a pure duopoly model to a mixed duopoly model. We find that choosing a price contract and playing in the first period make up a dominant strategy for the private firm. The public firm’s best response to the private firm’s dominant strategy is also to choose a price contract and play in the first period. As a result, simultaneous price competition is the unique equilibrium outcome, no matter whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Combining the findings in [loc. cit.], we present that simultaneous price competition is the unique result with complement products, irrespective of whether for a pure duopoly model or for a mixed duopoly model.
MSC:
| 91B54 | Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) |
| 91A20 | Multistage and repeated games |
Keywords:
Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; endogenous competition version; endogenous timing; mixed duopolyCitations:
Zbl 1284.91346References:
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