Bandits in the lab. (English) Zbl 1475.91097
Summary: We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents’ common state of the world. Subjects’ behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.
Keywords:
dynamic public-good problem; strategic experimentation; exponential bandits; learning; dynamic games; laboratory experimentsReferences:
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