Identifiable information structures. (English) Zbl 1437.91267
Summary: Consider a setting where many individuals forecast the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. We refer to the joint distribution over the states and signals as an “information structure”. An information structure is deemed identifiable if the distribution of forecasts is sufficient to determine the state of nature, even without knowing the underlying information structure. We characterize the set of identifiable information structures and propose a scheme that uniquely identifies the state of nature for the finite case.
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