×

Ranking-randomness-mechanism promotes cooperation in social dilemmas. (English) Zbl 07723556

Summary: Heterogeneity is widely considered to play a crucial role in ameliorating the cooperative dilemma problem. In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperative behavior in selfish groups from the perspective of heterogeneous neighbors and then propose a ranking-randomness-mechanism, where core lies in: (1) Player \(i\) removes links to potential defectors based on total payoff ranking; (2) If player \(i\) has no interactive neighbors, it randomly re-establishes links with its four nearest neighbors to avoid being isolated. Experimental data demonstrate that such a mechanism is suitable for increasing the level of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, snowdrift dilemma game and stag-hunt game. In addition, an interesting phenomenon is that when the link re-establishment probability is not equal to zero, within a large range of payoff parameters, cooperators are always able to prevent invasion of defectors and eventually occupy the entire square network.

MSC:

82-XX Statistical mechanics, structure of matter
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Colman, A. M., Game Theory and Its Applications: In the Social and Biological Sciences (2013), Psychology Press
[2] Kirley, M.; von der Osten, F. B., Risk sensitivity and assortment in social dilemmas, Soft Comput., 20, 10, 3775-3786 (2016)
[3] Axelrod, R.; Hamilton, W. D., The evolution of cooperation, Science, 211, 4489, 1390-1396 (1981) · Zbl 1225.92037
[4] Li, A.; Zhou, L.; Su, Q.; Cornelius, S. P.; Liu, Y.-Y.; Wang, L.; Levin, S. A., Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks, Nature Commun., 11, 1, 2259 (2020)
[5] Hofbauer, J.; Sigmund, K., Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (1998), Cambridge University Press · Zbl 0914.90287
[6] Wang, J.; He, J.; Yu, F., Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 146, Article 110887 pp. (2021) · Zbl 1498.91097
[7] Nowak, M.; Sigmund, K., A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game, Nature, 364, 6432, 56-58 (1993)
[8] Wang, Z.-R.; Deng, Z.-H.; Wang, H.-B.; Li, H. L.; Fei-Wang, X., Uneven resources network promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, Appl. Math. Comput., 413, Article 126619 pp. (2022) · Zbl 1510.91040
[9] You, T.; Zhang, H.; Zhang, Y.; Li, Q.; Zhang, P.; Yang, M., The influence of experienced guider on cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game, Appl. Math. Comput., 426, Article 127093 pp. (2022) · Zbl 1510.91044
[10] Hauert, C.; Doebeli, M., Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game, Nature, 428, 6983, 643-646 (2004)
[11] Wettergren, T. A., Replicator dynamics of an n-player snowdrift game with delayed payoffs, Appl. Math. Comput., 404, Article 126204 pp. (2021) · Zbl 1510.91041
[12] Gu, C.; Wang, X.; Ding, R.; Zhao, J.; Liu, Y., Evolutionary dynamics of multi-player snowdrift games based on the wright-fisher process, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 164, Article 112658 pp. (2022)
[13] Zhang, W.; Li, Y.; Xu, C.; Hui, P., Cooperative behavior and phase transitions in co-evolving stag hunt game, Physica A, 443, 161-169 (2016) · Zbl 1400.91034
[14] Dong, Y.; Xu, H.; Fan, S., Memory-based stag hunt game on regular lattices, Physica A, 519, 247-255 (2019) · Zbl 1514.91015
[15] Deng, Y.; Zhang, J., The choice-decision based on memory and payoff favors cooperation in stag hunt game on interdependent networks, Eur. Phys. J. B, 95, 2, 1-13 (2022)
[16] Nowak, M. A.; May, R. M., Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature, 359, 6398, 826-829 (1992)
[17] Barabási, A.-L.; Albert, R., Emergence of scaling in random networks, Science, 286, 5439, 509-512 (1999) · Zbl 1226.05223
[18] Dui, H.; Meng, X.; Xiao, H.; Guo, J., Analysis of the cascading failure for scale-free networks based on a multi-strategy evolutionary game, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 199, Article 106919 pp. (2020)
[19] Zhong, X.; Fan, Y.; Di, Z., The evolution of cooperation in public goods games on signed networks, Physica A, 582, Article 126217 pp. (2021)
[20] Heinsohn, R.; Packer, C., Complex cooperative strategies in group-territorial african lions, Science, 269, 5228, 1260-1262 (1995)
[21] Traulsen, A.; Nowak, M. A., Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 103, 29, 10952-10955 (2006)
[22] Eberhard, M. J.W., The evolution of social behavior by kin selection, Q. Rev. Biol., 50, 1, 1-33 (1975)
[23] Nowak, M. A., Five rules for the evolution of cooperation, Science, 314, 5805, 1560-1563 (2006)
[24] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas, J. R. Soc. Interface, 12, 103, Article 20141299 pp. (2015)
[25] Trivers, R. L., The evolution of reciprocal altruism, Q. Rev. Biol., 46, 1, 35-57 (1971)
[26] Luo, C.; Zhang, X.; Liu, H.; Shao, R., Cooperation in memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game on interdependent networks, Physica A, 450, 560-569 (2016) · Zbl 1400.91068
[27] Dhakal, S.; Chiong, R.; Chica, M.; Middleton, R. H., Climate change induced migration and the evolution of cooperation, Appl. Math. Comput., 377, Article 125090 pp. (2020) · Zbl 1508.91048
[28] Zhu, P.; Wang, X.; Jia, D.; Guo, Y.; Li, S.; Chu, C., Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game, Appl. Math. Comput., 386, Article 125474 pp. (2020) · Zbl 1497.91043
[29] Molleman, L.; Van den Berg, P.; Weissing, F. J., Consistent individual differences in human social learning strategies, Nature Commun., 5, 1, 3570 (2014)
[30] Huang, Y. J.; Deng, Z. H.; Song, Q.; Wu, T.; Deng, Z. L.; yu Gao, M., The evolution of cooperation in multi-games with aspiration-driven updating rule, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 128, 313-317 (2019) · Zbl 1483.91036
[31] Wang, H.; Sun, Y.; Zheng, L.; Du, W.; Li, Y., The public goods game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous investment, Physica A, 509, 396-404 (2018)
[32] Ma, X.; Quan, J.; Wang, X., Effect of reputation-based heterogeneous investment on cooperation in spatial public goods game, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 152, Article 111353 pp. (2021) · Zbl 1498.91190
[33] Liu, C.; Wang, J.; Li, X.; Xia, C., The link weight adjustment considering historical strategy promotes the cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, Physica A, 554, Article 124691 pp. (2020)
[34] Qin, J.; Chen, Y.; Fu, W.; Kang, Y.; Perc, M., Neighborhood diversity promotes cooperation in social dilemmas, IEEE Access, 6, 5003-5009 (2018)
[35] Hu, X.; Liu, X., Unfixed-neighbor-mechanism promotes cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game on lattice, Physica A, 572, Article 125910 pp. (2021)
[36] Shu, F., A win-switch-lose-stay strategy promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games, Physica A, 555, Article 124605 pp. (2020)
[37] de Oliveira, B.; Szolnoki, A., Social dilemmas in off-lattice populations, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 144, Article 110743 pp. (2021)
[38] Zhu, C.; Sun, S.; Wang, J.; Xia, C., Role of population density and increasing neighborhood in the evolution of cooperation on diluted lattices, Physica A, 392, 24, 6353-6360 (2013)
[39] Nagashima, K.; Tanimoto, J., A stochastic pairwise fermi rule modified by utilizing the average in payoff differences of neighbors leads to increased network reciprocity in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games, Appl. Math. Comput., 361, 661-669 (2019) · Zbl 1429.91056
[40] Wang, Z.; Kokubo, S.; Jusup, M.; Tanimoto, J., Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games, Phys. Life Rev., 14, 1-30 (2015)
[41] Lv, S.; Song, F., Particle swarm intelligence and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with punishment, Appl. Math. Comput., 412, Article 126586 pp. (2022) · Zbl 1510.91032
[42] Metropolis, N.; Ulam, S., The Monte Carlo method, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc., 44, 247, 335-341 (1949) · Zbl 0033.28807
[43] Simpson, B.; Willer, R., Beyond altruism: Sociological foundations of cooperation and prosocial behavior, Annu. Rev. Sociol., 41, 43-63 (2015)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.