Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization. (English) Zbl 1297.91061
Summary: There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules.
MSC:
| 91B14 | Social choice |
References:
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