Multilateral matching. (English) Zbl 1314.91167
J. Econ. Theory 156, 175-206 (2015); corrigendum ibid. 184, Article ID 104933, 5 p. (2019).
Summary: We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems and, when agents’ utilities are concave in venture participation, show that competitive equilibria exist, correspond to stable outcomes, and yield core outcomes. Competitive equilibria exist in our setting even when externalities are present.
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