Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets. (English) Zbl 1471.91343
Summary: Stable mechanisms are not strategy-proof in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences, and there is a continuum of students. We find an upper bound for the colleges’ capacities vector such that colleges have the incentive to report their capacities truthfully in any stable mechanism.
MSC:
| 91B68 | Matching models |
References:
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