Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule. (English) Zbl 1530.91167
This article examines the social acceptability of majoritarian compromise rules. It establishes that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is even. When the number of alternatives is odd, it provides a necessary and sufficient condition, on the size of the set of voters relatively to the number of alternatives, for the majoritarian compromise rule always selecting a socially acceptable alternative. Furthermore, it shows that, if we restrict ourselves to one of the three classes of single-peaked, single-caved, and single-crossing preferences, the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative regardless of the number of alternatives and the number of voters. It also shows that, in the case of group separable profiles, the majoritarian compromise winner can be socially unacceptable.
MSC:
| 91B14 | Social choice |
References:
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