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Comparison of competition strategy and retail mode of asymmetric emission reduction in supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation. (English) Zbl 1487.90139

Summary: With people’s increasing awareness of the dangers of climate warming, the cap-and-trade scheme in supply chain has been gradually implemented worldwide. However, many companies have not engaged in carbon emission reduction, and the market is under asymmetric competition. In this context, this article focuses on the asymmetric competition between manufacturers under the cap-and-trade regulation and compares different retail modes. At the same time, four models are constructed from two different perspectives: the short-term game and the long-term repeated game. The results show that the manufacturer’s optimal price increases with the commission coefficient when the carbon gap is significant in the short-term game, while the carbon emission reduction decreases with the coefficient. And the profits of the manufacturer who contributes to carbon emission reduction are more sensitive to changes in the commission coefficient. Under the reselling mode, the retailer’s participation in pricing will intensify supply chain competition. When the carbon gap is significant, carbon emission reduction will decrease with the increasing carbon trading price. By comparison, the carbon emission reduction level under the reselling mode is higher when the carbon gap is significant; when the commission coefficient is moderate, the retailer in the agency mode has higher profits. In the long-term game, the system is more likely to be in chaos when the manufacturer’s adjustment speed is too high.

MSC:

90B06 Transportation, logistics and supply chain management
91B76 Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91A22 Evolutionary games
90B30 Production models
91B55 Economic dynamics
91B74 Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.)
Full Text: DOI

References:

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