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Inequity aversion in dynamically complex supply chains. (English) Zbl 1487.90095

Summary: Inequity aversion models developed by E. Fehr and K. M. Schmidt [Q. J. Econ. 114, No. 3, 817–868 (1999; Zbl 0944.91022)] and G. Bolton and A. Ockenfels [“ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition”, Am. Econ. Rev. 90, No. 1, 166–193 (2000; doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166)] assume that, in addition to purely selfish subjects, there are subjects who dislike inequitable outcomes. Within the supply chain management literature, these models were used to study fairness concerns. A common limitation in this research area has been the use of rather simple settings, mainly dyadic channels with a single supplier and retailer. Thus, researching social preferences in different channel structures and the idea of multiple-player groups have been suggested as interesting future research areas. In this paper, we present dynamic analyses of the two inequity aversion models and their application in the Beer Distribution Game setting. Our simulation results challenge currently held assumptions about fairness perceptions among supply chain members. We provide some structural explanations for this and suggests future research areas.

MSC:

90B06 Transportation, logistics and supply chain management
91A80 Applications of game theory

Citations:

Zbl 0944.91022

Software:

DYNAMO
Full Text: DOI

References:

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