Summary: Researches on cooperative advertising mainly focus on the equilibrium of the single cooperation. In this paper, the dynamic policy adjustment of multiple games is discussed. Firstly, the classical demand function is selected to establish the model, and the Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the single game of manufacturer as the leader is obtained. In this circumstance, the greater impact the local advertising has on sales, the less proportion of advertising subsidies the manufacturer is willing to provide. On this basis, the dynamic policy adjustments of the manufacturer and retailer under repeated games are studied, and the two game models of first adjustment of the manufacturer and first adjustment of the retailer are established respectively. The results of numerical examples show that the strategies of the manufacturer and retailer under the two new models tend to be stable. Furthermore, as for the game model of the first adjustment strategy for the retailer, the profits of both the manufacturer and retailer become stable, and compared to the other two situations, both sides are more willing to accept this situation.