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Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. (English) Zbl 1254.91231

Summary: We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents’ preferences are additive, no such rule exists.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B14 Social choice
91A12 Cooperative games

References:

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