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Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies. (English) Zbl 1248.91055

With Hart’s classical result [O. D. Hart, Econometrica 47, 1057–1083 (1979; Zbl 0418.90008)] in the background, the main point of this paper is, to give a frame (a suitable topology on the space of production economies) and conditions (esp. for ownership structures) such that the behavior of sequences of large economies and suitable limit economies can be considered. It is shown, that Hart’s assumption “all agents are typical” is very restrictive and a new proof of his result is given without the mentioned condition. From this some general convergence theorems are proved containing conditions, such that (e.g.) in the limit economy \(E\) there is a profit maximizing production plan \(y\) (at prices \(p\), where \(p\) is a unique equilibrium price associated with \(y\) in \(E\)).

MSC:

91B54 Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
91B52 Special types of economic equilibria
91B38 Production theory, theory of the firm
90B30 Production models
49J45 Methods involving semicontinuity and convergence; relaxation
90C33 Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming)

Citations:

Zbl 0418.90008

References:

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