×

The Buyer’s procuring mechanism under operating cost sharing in supply chain. (English) Zbl 1231.90105

Summary: This paper considers a buyer’s procuring strategy where the buyer purchases products from a supplier in order to minimize his total cost. Assume that the customer arrivals follow a Poisson process, a base-stock policy is implemented by the buyer, and the supplier will afford partial operating cost incurred by the buyer. The cost shared by the buyer includes procuring cost and some operating cost. The supplier does not hold the inventory and her production time is exponentially distributed. The objective of the supplier is to maximize her profit. The buyer designs a contract to minimize his total expected cost. Two different cases are considered: One potential supplier and many competing suppliers. The optimal control approaches are used to design the buyer’s optimal mechanism and some simple procurement mechanisms are presented.

MSC:

90B06 Transportation, logistics and supply chain management
60K10 Applications of renewal theory (reliability, demand theory, etc.)
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] G. P. Cachon and F. Zhang, Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry, Management Science, 2006, 52(6): 881–896. · Zbl 1232.91277 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0510
[2] Y. K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, Rand Journal of Economics, 1993, 24(4): 668–680. · doi:10.2307/2555752
[3] F. Branco, The design of multidimensional auctions, Rand Journal of Economics, 1997, 28(1): 63–81. · doi:10.2307/2555940
[4] R. Chen, R. Roundy, R. Zhang, and G. Janakiraman, Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement, Management Science, 2005, 51(3): 467–482. · Zbl 1232.90174 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0329
[5] F. Chen, Auctioning supply contracts, Management Science, 2007, 53(10): 1562–1576. · Zbl 1232.91282 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0716
[6] P. Klemperer, Auction theory: A guide to the literature, Journal of Economics Surveys, 1999, 13(3): 227–286. · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083
[7] C. J. Corbett and X. de Groote, A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information, Management Science, 2000, 46(3): 444–450. · Zbl 1231.90024 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.46.3.444.12065
[8] C. J. Corbett, Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric information: Cycle stocks, safety stocks, and consignment stock, Operations Research, 2001, 49(4): 487–500. · Zbl 1163.90326 · doi:10.1287/opre.49.4.487.11223
[9] C. J. Corbett, D. Zhou, and C. S. Tang, Designing supply contracts: contract type and information asymmetry, Management Science, 2004, 50(4): 550–559. · Zbl 1232.90036 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0173
[10] K. C. So and S. J. Song, Price delivery time guarantees and capacity selection, European Journal of Operational Research, 1998, 111(1): 28–49. · Zbl 0948.90081 · doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00314-7
[11] G. P. Cachon and P. T. Harker, Competition and outsourcing with scale economies, Management Science, 2002, 48(10): 1314–1333. · Zbl 1232.91471 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.10.1314.271
[12] S. Chayet and W. Hopp, Risk sensitive sizing of responsive facilities, Naval Research Logistics, 2008, 55(3): 218–233. · Zbl 1210.90001 · doi:10.1002/nav.20278
[13] G. Allon and A. Federgruen, Competition in service industries, Operations Research, 2007, 55(1): 37–55. · Zbl 1167.90437 · doi:10.1287/opre.1060.0337
[14] R. Caldentey and L. M. Wein, Analysis of a decentralized production-inventory system, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2003, 5(1): 1–17. · doi:10.1287/msom.5.1.1.12764
[15] B. Salanie, The Economics of Contracts, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, 1999.
[16] S. P. Sethi and G. L. Thompson, Optimal Control Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston Dordrdrecht London, MA, 2000. · Zbl 0998.49002
[17] K. Rosling, Inventory cost rate functions with nonlinear shortage costs, Operations Research, 2002, 50(6): 1007–1017. · Zbl 1163.90346 · doi:10.1287/opre.50.6.1007.346
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.