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Global patent protection: channels of North and South welfare gain. (English) Zbl 1198.91126

Summary: The literature on dynamic intellectual property protection (IPP) often assumes a single margin of innovation, implying that the innovator cannot reassign research efforts among multiple sectors. This leads to special results. With two dimensions of innovation, previously unavailable avenues of cooperation and mutual interest arise: The South may benefit from higher standards of IPP than in the North, and the North may gain from differentially weaker Southern IPP. Channels are traced. Key features not previously found include the ability of lower Southern IPP to spur innovation of Northern goods and make available greater resources for Northern production of current consumption.

MSC:

91B60 Trade models
91B66 Multisectoral models in economics
91B15 Welfare economics
Full Text: DOI

References:

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