Design and analysis of Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange using one-time ID by SVO logic. (English) Zbl 1272.94082
Degano, Pierpaolo (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 2nd workshop on automated reasoning for security protocol analysis (ARSPA 2005), Lisbon, Portugal, July 16, 2005. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135, No. 1, 79-94 (2005).
Summary: Authenticated key exchange protocols have been developed to establish secure channels on the internet. In this paper, we consider the following attacks against an authenticated key exchange using shared secret: eavesdropping, DoS attack, replay attack, and impersonation. Besides prevention from all these attacks, efficiency is also important. In this paper, we propose a three-party authenticated key exchange protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with one-time ID, which is a user’s extraordinary identity used only once [H. Krawczyk, The IKE-SIGMA protocol. Internet draft (2001), http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/draft-krawczyk-ipsec-ike-sigma-00.txt]. Moreover, we analyze our proposal by SVO logic, which is one of formal methods to analyze cryptographic protocols [P. Syverson and P. C. van Oorschot, A unified cryptographic protocol logic. NRL CHAOS Report 5540-227 (1996); P. Syverson and I. Cervesato, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2171, 63–136 (2001; Zbl 1007.68510)], and show what assumptions are needed.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1272.68016].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1272.68016].
