Summary: We prove that in a two-player zero-sum repeated game where one of the players, say player \(1\), is more informed than his opponent and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists.{ }This result extends previous results on Markov decision processes with partial observation [D. Rosenberg et al., Ann. Stat. 30, No. 4, 1178–1193 (2002; Zbl 1103.90402)], and repeated games with an informed controller [J. Renault, Math. Oper. Res. 37, No. 1, 154–179 (2012; Zbl 1238.91027)]. Our formal definition of a more informed player is more general than the inclusion of signals, allowing therefore for imperfect monitoring of actions. We construct an auxiliary stochastic game whose state space is the set of second order beliefs of player \(2\) (beliefs about beliefs of player \(1\) on the state variable of the original game) with perfect monitoring and we prove it has a value by using a result of Renault [loc. cit.]. A key element in this work is to prove that player \(1\) can use strategies of the auxiliary game in the original game in our general framework, from which we deduce that the value of the auxiliary game is also the value of our original game by using classical arguments.