Subgame perfect coalition formation. (English) Zbl 1520.91069
Summary: We analyze a dynamic game where players can each make offers to other players to form coalitions. We show that these games have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is individually rational and, when players can make enough proposals, Pareto optimal. We also provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium to implement core coalition structures.
MSC:
| 91A25 | Dynamic games |
| 91A20 | Multistage and repeated games |
| 91A11 | Equilibrium refinements |
| 91B03 | Mechanism design theory |
Keywords:
coalition formation; sequential proposer game; mechanism design; subgame perfection; Pareto optimalityReferences:
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