Summary: Evolutionary dynamics experienced by mixed microbial populations of cooperators and cheaters has been examined in experiments in the literature using a protocol of periodic dilution to investigate the properties of resilience and adaptability to environmental changes. Data depicted on an appropriate phase diagram indicate, among other features, a stable equilibrium point at which cooperators and cheaters coexist [A. Sanchez and J. Gore, “Feedback between population and evolutionary dynamics determines the fate of social microbial populations”, Plos Biol. 11, No. 4, e1001547 (2013; doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001547)]. We present here a phenomenological analysis of these data focusing on an eco-evolutionary-game perspective. To that end, we work on an extension of the model proposed in [Y. Tao and R. Cressman, Bull. Math. Biol. 69, No. 4, 1377–1399 (2007; Zbl 1298.91040)]. It’s original version takes into account changes of the total population density while the individuals experience a pairwise Prisoners Dilemma game. The extension devised here contains a dilution parameter to conform with the experimental procedure, in addition to a term accounting for Allee effects. In contrast to other descriptions proposed in similar contexts, however, the model here does not account for assortative encounters, group or kin selection. Nonetheless, it describes surprisingly well both qualitatively and quantitatively the features of the observed phase diagram. We discuss these results in terms of the behavior of an effective payoff matrix defined accordingly.