Game analysis and benefit allocation in international projects among owner, supervisor and contractor. (English) Zbl 1342.93020
Summary: International projects are different from general domestic ones. In order to analyze the differences, a tripartite game model is built up to describe the relationship among owner, supervisor and general contractor, and some measures are given for the owner to more effectively complete the project. In addition, a project schedule selection model is formulated and a new benefit allocation method is proposed by introducing a new modified Shapley value with weighted factor.
MSC:
| 93A30 | Mathematical modelling of systems (MSC2010) |
| 93A10 | General systems |
| 91A40 | Other game-theoretic models |
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